

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

FOI/PA

DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET

FOI/PA# 1353814-000

Total Deleted Page(s) = 8

Page 6 ~ b5; b6; b7C; b7E;

Page 7 ~ b1; b3; b5; b6; b7C; b7E;

Page 8 ~ b1; b3; b5; b6; b7C; b7E;

Page 9 ~ b1; b3; b5; b6; b7C; b7E;

Page 11 ~ b1; b3; b5; b6 - per FBI, DOS; b7C; b7E;

Page 12 ~ b1; b3; b5; b6 - per FBI, DOS; b7C; b7E;

Page 13 ~ b1; b3; b5; b6; b7C; b7E;

Page 14 ~ b1; b3; b5; b6; b7C; b7E;

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

X Deleted Page(s) X

X No Duplication Fee X

X For this Page X

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG

REASON: 1.4 (C)

DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2041

DATE: 04-12-2024

DECLASSIFIED BY: NSICG
ON 11-27-2018

b6
b7C

FD-340 (Rev. 4-11-0)

File Number

Field Office A

Serial # of Originating Document

9

Date Received

FEB 26, 2016

From

(Name of Complainant/interviewee)

b1
b3

b6
b7C

(Address)

(City and State)

By

b6
b7C

To Be Returned Yes

No

Receipt Given Yes

No

Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6 (e)
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure

Yes

No

Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI)

Yes

No

MIDYEAR EXAM

1A7

Reference:

(Communication Enclosing Material)

Description: Original notes re interview of

- NOTES OF INTERVIEW w/ [redacted]

- NDA

- REF DOCS/EMAILS

b6
b7C

b1
b3

HRC-12263

International Component... / Activities of Impact (equities) ^{Dos}
Private Sector engagement

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

is communication
Both unclass & class info exchange.
@ "whatever easiest @ time"

[redacted]
b6
b7c

Take Sullivan travelling w/ Sec. Most often - mostly
phone/email b/w J & I low

	JS	CM
POEMS - language	✓	/
SIPR	✓	✓
JWICS X	Assume	Assume

C. Mils met w/ re: USAID & Comms
JS policy - prep. for DC/PC
Huma - logistics
Philip R. - Comms
Exec Sec / Special Ass't.

Not aware of people @ State using private email for
DoS business

Have email from CM & JS but don't recall
exchanging work e.

[redacted]
b1
b3
b6
b7c

2-26-2016

→ died Dec 2020.

Holbrook hired [] on as []
discussions in []

Started in [] Started in []

[]

b6 per FBI, DOS
b7C per FBI, DOS

Nov/Dec 2012 dequared

became []

Office in DC but traveled 1-3 weeks per mo
during tenure.

Afghanistan - 1 x every mo - 6 weeks

→ Holbrook close connection w/ 7th floor

→ direct contact w/ Sec Clinton

not frequent

[] would have direct contact on occasions

b6
b7C

[] External facing - Congressional, Inter. Engagements
Economic Engaging

[]

w. C. Mills []

[] (b) J. Sullivan knew a little prior

When Holbrook passed [] just started traveling

w/ Sec. to countries in region

[] more focused on Pak [] more Afgh.

b6
b7C

Discussions w/ CM & DS - anything re Af Pak
needing attn of Sec.

1328

[redacted] didn't have access to High Side b1
b3
b6
b7C

1328/01 Interest in

- generic policy response - didn't
- Not preferred method but on occasion would be sent
- on low side b/c of timing.

Counter Offers / Guidance on - No

[redacted]

b1
b3
b6
b7C

[redacted] dont recall email

unusually large distribution

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

Cc: [redacted] not sure if TS clearance
Monetary Rep Mission

b1
b3
b6
b7C
b7E

[redacted]
[redacted] - trying to remember circumstance, [redacted] don't know where located @ time.

X



U.S. Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of Investigation

601 4th Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20535

CLASSIFIED INFORMATION NON-DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

b6
b7C

I [redacted], certify that on this date,

[redacted] 24-2017, I was informed by Special Agent(s) of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) of a sensitive national security matter. I understand that disclosure of any classified information related to this matter is strictly prohibited.

I understand that the United States Government may seek any remedy available to it to enforce this agreement.

I understand that the unauthorized disclosure, unauthorized retention, or negligent handling of classified information related to this matter by me could cause damage or irreparable injury to the United States or could be used to advantage by a foreign nation. I further understand that I am obligated to comply with laws and regulations that prohibit the unauthorized disclosure of classified information.

I understand that all classified information related to this matter is now and will remain the property of, or under the control of, the United States Government unless and until otherwise determined by an authorized official or final ruling of a court of law.

These provisions are consistent with and do not supersede, conflict with, or otherwise alter employee obligations, rights or liabilities created by existing statute or Executive order relating to: (1) classified information; (2) communications to Congress; (3) the reporting to an Inspector General of a violation of any law, rule, or regulation or of mismanagement, gross waste of funds, abuse of authority, or of a substantial and specific danger to the public health or safety; or (4) any other whistleblower protection. The definitions, requirements, obligations, rights, sanctions, and liabilities created by controlling Executive orders and statutory provisions are incorporated into this agreement and are controlling.

Unless and until I am released in writing by the FBI, I understand that all conditions and obligations [redacted] apply during this interview and at all times thereafter.

b6
b7C

[redacted]
Date of Birth

[redacted]

Date

b1
b3
b6
b7C

ALL FED INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-27-2018 BY [redacted] NSICOG

From: Mills, Cheryl D <MillsCD@state.gov>
Sent: Tuesday, December 27, 2011 11:57 AM
To: H
Subject: FW: (SBU)

DOS READING ROOM
F-2014-20439-C05785980

Classified by DAS, A/GIS, DoS on 2/29/2016
~ Class: SECRET ~ Reason: 1.4(C), 1.4(D) ~
Declassify on: 12/26/2036

From: [redacted]
Sent: Tuesday, December 27, 2011 11:38 AM
To: Mills, Cheryl D
Cc: Sullivan, Jacob J
Subject: RE: (SBU)

b1 per FBI, DOS
b3
b6
b7C

From: [redacted]
Sent: Tuesday, December 27, 2011 11:02 AM
To: Mills, Cheryl D
Cc: Sullivan, Jacob J
Subject: RE: (SBU)

b1 per FBI, DOS
b3
b6
b7C

From: Mills, Cheryl D
Sent: Tuesday, December 27, 2011 5:45 AM
To: [redacted]
Cc: Sullivan, Jacob J
Subject: Re: (SBU)

b6
b7C

What happened on this?

From: [redacted]
Sent: Friday, December 23, 2011 10:38 AM
To: Mills, Cheryl D

b6
b7C

b1
b3

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

FOI/PA

DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET

FOI/PA# 1353814-000

Total Deleted Page(s) = 8

Page 4 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C;

Page 5 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C;

Page 6 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C;

Page 7 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C;

Page 9 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C;

Page 10 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C;

Page 11 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C;

Page 12 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C;

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

X Deleted Page(s) X

X No Duplication Fee X

X For this Page X

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

Subject: RE: (SBU)

b1
b3
b6
b7C

Mills, Cheryl D

Sent: Friday, December 23, 2011 10:36 AM

To:

Subject: RE: (SBU)

b6
b7C

Thanks – you good with this

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG

REASON: 1.4 (C)

DECLASSIFY ON 12-31-2036

DATE 03-27-2024

From:

Sent: Friday, December 23, 2011 10:22 AM

To: Mills, Cheryl D; Sullivan, Jacob J

Subject: FW: (SBU)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

b6
b7C

I'm sure you know already, but just in case

From:

Sent: Friday, December 23, 2011 10:12 AM

To: Ruggiero, Frank J

Subject: (SBU)

b1
b3
b6
b7C

Frank

Cameron

b1
b3

From: Sullivan, Jacob J <SullivanJJ@state.gov>
Sent: Saturday, February 25, 2012 1:15 PM
To: H
Subject: Fw: Alert

This is hitting the news, with Taliban or HQN claiming responsibility.

From: [redacted]
Sent: Saturday, February 25, 2012 10:31 AM
To: Sullivan, Jacob J
Subject: Fw: Alert

b6
b7C

Unbelievable.

From: [redacted]
Sent: Saturday, February 25, 2012 10:10 AM
To: Grossman, Marc I; Ruggiero, Frank J; [redacted] Raphael, Robin L; Jones, Beth E (S/SRAP)
Cc: [redacted] Pratt, Jonathan G; Kofmehl, Scott; Moss, Mitchell R; Stroh, Mark E; "ken.keen@ibab.afcent.af.mil"
<ken.keen@ibab.afcent.af.mil>
Subject: Alert

b6
b7C

Marc: [redacted]

b1
b3
b6
b7C

Dick

Amb. Richard E. Hoagland
Deputy Chief of Mission
U.S. Embassy Islamabad
TEL: 92 51 208 2502
FAX: 92 51 208 2559
E/M: HoaglandRE@state.gov

SBU
This email is UNCLASSIFIED

b1
b3

HRC-12279

b1
b3
b6
b7C

From: Sullivan, Jacob J <SullivanJJ@state.gov>
Sent: Friday, April 27, 2012 7:27 AM
To: H
Subject: Fw: Day 2

DOS READING ROOM
E-2014-20439-C05792212

FYI

Classified by DAS, AVGIS, DoS on 2/26/208
~ Class: SECRET ~ Reason: 1.4(b), 1.4(D)
~ Declassify on 4/26/2037

----- Original Message -----

From: [redacted]
Sent: Friday, April 27, 2012 03:44 AM
To: Nides, Thomas R; Sullivan, Jacob J
Subject: Day 2

b1 per FBI, DOS
b3
b6
b7C

I'm stuck en route home in Kuwait, but after a decent first day.

[redacted]
[redacted]
Marc can also make calls back when he's
wheels up, which is around 9 am EST. If I hear more, I'll let you know.

[redacted]
b1
b3

~~54-5731~~
— PENDING REVIEW —

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-27-2018 BY [redacted] NSICG

From: [redacted]
Sent: Monday, May 30, 2011 12:11 AM
To: Sullivan, Jacob J
Subject: Fw: Update

CLASSIFIED BY NSICG [redacted] b6
REASON: 1.4 (C) b7C
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2036
DATE: 03-27-2024

Didn't see this before we talked.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

----- Original Message -----

From: JBE [redacted]
Sent: Sunday, May 29, 2011 11:46 PM
To: [redacted]
Subject: Update

b1
b3
b6
b7C

They talked.

[redacted]
Have a good night.

Jeremy

— PENDING REVIEW —

HRC-12285

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
FOI/PA
DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET
FOI/PA# 1353814-000

Total Deleted Page(s) = 18

Page 2 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C;
Page 3 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C;
Page 8 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C;
Page 9 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C;
Page 12 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C;
Page 13 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C;
Page 14 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C;
Page 15 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C;
Page 16 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C;
Page 17 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C;
Page 18 ~ Duplicate;
Page 19 ~ b5; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 20 ~ b1; b3; b5; b7E;
Page 21 ~ b1; b3; b5; b7E;
Page 22 ~ b5; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 23 ~ b1; b3; b5; b7E;
Page 24 ~ b1; b3; b5; b7E;
Page 28 ~ b1; b3;

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

X Deleted Page(s) X

X No Duplication Fee X

X For this Page X

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

IA9

1340 (Rev. 4-11)

File Number

b1

b3

Federal Office Acquiring Evidence wfc

Serial # of Originating Document 11

Date Received 3-15-16

From

(Name of Contributor/Interviewee)

b6
b7C

(Address)

Washington DC

(City and State)

By

b6
b7C

To Be Returned Yes No

Receipt Given Yes No

Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6 (e)

Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure

Yes No

Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI)

Yes No

Midyear Exam

Reference: Interview Notes

(Communication Enclosing Material)

Description: Original notes re interview of

b6
b7C

IA9



U.S. Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of Investigation

601 4th Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20535

CLASSIFIED INFORMATION NON-DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

I _____, certify that on this date, _____, I was informed by Special Agent(s) of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) of a sensitive national security matter. I understand that disclosure of any classified information related to this matter is strictly prohibited.

I understand that the United States Government may seek any remedy available to it to enforce this agreement.

I understand that the unauthorized disclosure, unauthorized retention, or negligent handling of classified information related to this matter by me could cause damage or irreparable injury to the United States or could be used to advantage by a foreign nation. I further understand that I am obligated to comply with laws and regulations that prohibit the unauthorized disclosure of classified information.

I understand that all classified information related to this matter is now and will remain the property of, or under the control of, the United States Government unless and until otherwise determined by an authorized official or final ruling of a court of law.

These provisions are consistent with and do not supersede, conflict with, or otherwise alter employee obligations, rights or liabilities created by existing statute or Executive order relating to: (1) classified information; (2) communications to Congress; (3) the reporting to an Inspector General of a violation of any law, rule, or regulation or of mismanagement, gross waste of funds, abuse of authority, or of a substantial and specific danger to the public health or safety; or (4) any other whistleblower protection. The definitions, requirements, obligations, rights, sanctions, and liabilities created by controlling Executive orders and statutory provisions are incorporated into this agreement and are controlling.

Unless and until I am released in writing by the FBI, I understand that all conditions and obligations imposed upon me by this agreement apply during this interview and at all times thereafter.

Signature

Date of Birth

Witness

Date

b7E per DOS

not common but sometimes happen

[redacted] laugh & draws set to "See high side is down
so I'm unmasking."

"Facunaing" "Yeah I remember that"

Timing interesting:

Mol - Ministry of Int. Raymond Malou or carefully
worded summ "like this one"

Short summary of what [redacted] said.

More detailed report would have included info about

"getting close to line obviously"


no concerns - "business as usual" others conducted
same way No formal guidance if pref.

you know how to do it & how much to do" X

b6
b7C

Att. Options

Secure call
to Ops ctr.b1
b3



Never direct comms w/ Dos

As per D/P follow COC

through A Sec of State — think Richard Boucher
 Maybe Robert Blake.

emails could get forwarded

Dont think ever directly copied JS, HA, CM b/c not
 in COC

b6
b7c

[redacted] before sec visit to Knaaz in'

protocol didnt change for urgent matters: go to Op Ctr

Didnt know Sec Clinton had private email or server

[Redacted] = "very vague" but pointed out closed recipients

b7E

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

FOI/PA

DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET

FOI/PA# 1353814-000

Total Deleted Page(s) = 10

Page 2 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C;

Page 3 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C;

Page 4 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C;

Page 6 ~ Duplicate;

Page 7 ~ Duplicate;

Page 11 ~ Duplicate;

Page 12 ~ Duplicate;

Page 16 ~ Duplicate;

Page 17 ~ Duplicate;

Page 18 ~ Duplicate;

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

X Deleted Page(s) X

X No Duplication Fee X

X For this Page X

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

FD-340 (Rev. 4-11-03)

File Number [redacted]

b3
b7E

Field Office Acquiring Evidence WFO

Serial # of Originating Document _____

Date Received 4/9/14

From Cheney M. H.

(Name of Contributor/interviewee)

(Address)

(City and State)

By [redacted]

b6
b7C

To Be Returned Yes No

Receipt Given Yes No

Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6 (e)

Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure

Yes No

Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI)

Yes No

M. Cheney

Reference: Interview Notes
(Communication Enclosing Material)

Description: Original notes re interview of Cheney M. H.

From: "Mills, Cheryl D" <SBUSTATE/SES/RECIPIENTS/MILLSCD>
Sent: 2/13/2009 4:42:37 PM +00 00
To: 'hdr22@clintonemail.com'
Subject: FW: Update

b6
b7c

0

Re: BlackBerry requirement update - I am cc'ing you on this message. b3 per DOS

I am definitely up for it - Debbie Plunkett [redacted] (Debbie Plunkett) - State's Information Assurance Director, is personally assembling a team to work with you and other members of your staff to move forward on your Blackberry requirement. She will engage State's CIO and DS/comms security folks to ensure everyone is aware of the art of the possible. She asked me to provide dates/times when you may be available to meet - I will ask my Executive Assistant [redacted] to work with Lori to make this happen. I am confident we can get to YES on this!

From: [redacted] b3 per DOS
Sent: Friday, February 13, 2009 11:08 AM
To: Mills, Cheryl D
Cc: McLean, Lori A, [redacted]
Subject: Update

Cheryl,

Debbie Plunkett, D/Chief of our Information Assurance Directorate, is personally assembling a knowledgeable team to work with you and other members of your staff to move forward on your Blackberry requirement. She will engage State's CIO and DS/comms security folks to ensure everyone is aware of the art of the possible. She asked me to provide dates/times when you may be available to meet - I will ask my Executive Assistant [redacted] to work with Lori to make this happen. I am confident we can get to YES on this!

b3 per DOS

The reports we discussed are at a higher level than can be forwarded on the high side, so we will deliver them to your office today (our reporting staff is retrieving them now)

Thank you so much for making the time for Dick and me today. All the best, [redacted]

PR_RIM_INTERNET_MESS
AGE_ID:
PR_RIM_MSG_REF_ID:
PR_RIM_MESSAGE_SUBMISSION_ID:

[redacted]
state.sbu>
-667286318

b7E per DOS

From: Anne-Marie Slaughter [redacted]
Sent: Saturday, June 4, 2011 11:00 AM
To: Mills, Cheryl D; slaughter [redacted]
Cc: Abedin, Huma; Sullivan, Jacob J
Subject: RE: Google email hacking and woeful state of civilian technology

DOS READING ROOM:
F-2014-20439:
C05780317

[redacted] This e-mail message may contain neither recommendations nor conclusions of the U.S. Department of State. It is the property of the U.S. Government, is being provided to you as an official in your capacity as an employee of the U.S. Government, and is loaned to you. It may not be copied or distributed outside your agency without prior approval of the appropriate official. If you are not an employee of the U.S. Government, you have received this message in error.

b6 per DOS

From: Mills, Cheryl D [mailto:MillsCD@state.gov]
Sent: Saturday, June 04, 2011 5:52 AM
To: hdr22@clintonemail.com; slaughter [redacted]
Cc: Abedin, Huma; Sullivan, Jacob J
Subject: Re: Google email hacking and woeful state of civilian technology

[redacted] This e-mail message may contain neither recommendations nor conclusions of the U.S. Department of State. It is the property of the U.S. Government, is being provided to you as an official in your capacity as an employee of the U.S. Government, and is loaned to you. It may not be copied or distributed outside your agency without prior approval of the appropriate official. If you are not an employee of the U.S. Government, you have received this message in error.

From: H [mailto:HDR22@clintonemail.com]
Sent: Friday, June 03, 2011 07:27 PM
To: 'slaughter' [redacted]
Cc: Abedin, Huma; Mills, Cheryl D; Sullivan, Jacob J
Subject: Re: Google email hacking and woeful state of civilian technology

b6 per DOS

[redacted]
From: Anne-Marie Slaughter [redacted]
Sent: Friday, June 03, 2011 10:35 AM
To: H
Cc: Abedin, Huma <AbedinH@state.gov>; Mills, Cheryl D <MillsCD@state.gov>; Sullivan, Jacob J <SullivanJJ@state.gov>
Subject: Google email hacking and woeful state of civilian technology

I'm sure you've thought of this, but it would be a great time for someone inside or outside to make a statement/ write an op-ed that points out that State's technology is so antiquated that NO ONE uses a State-issued laptop and even high officials routinely end up using their home email accounts to be able to get their work done quickly and effectively. Further cuts to State's budget just makes matters much much worse. We actually need more funds to significantly upgrade our technology. AM

DOS READING ROOM
F-2017-12272:
C06336460

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-26-2018 BY [redacted] NSI:b6
b7C

From: svSMARTmh
Sent: 6/28/2011 6:42:47 PM
To: SMART Core
Subject: Securing Personal E-mail Accounts

UNCLASSIFIED



MRN: 11 STATE 65111
 Date/DTG Jun 28 2011 / 2322Z JUN 11
 From: SECSTATE WASHDC
 Action: ALL DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR POSTS COLLECTIVE/TYPE
 E.O.: 13526
 TAGS APCS ASEC AADP AMGT
 Subject: Securing Personal E-mail Accounts

UNCLAS STATE 065111

E.O. 13526 N/A
 TAGS APCS ASEC AADP AMGT
 SUBJECT: Securing Personal E-mail Accounts

Reference

A) 12 FAM 544.3

1. Department of State users are encouraged to check the security settings and change passwords of their home e-mail accounts because of recent targeting of personal e-mail accounts by online adversaries. Security guidelines have been posted on the DS/SI/CS Cyber Security Awareness web page <https://intranet.ds.state.sbu/DS/SI/CS/Awareness1/Content/Perso>nal%20Email.aspx

2. Recently, Google asserted that online adversaries are targeting the personal Gmail accounts of U.S. government employees. Although the company believes it has taken appropriate steps to remediate identified activity, users should exercise caution and follow best practices in order to protect personal e-mail and prevent the compromise of government and personal information. The DS/SI/CS Cyber Security Awareness web site contains guides to help secure the web-based e-mail accounts of users and their families. This information can be accessed at <https://intranet.ds.state.sbu/DS/SI/CS/Awareness1/Content/Perso>nal%20Email.aspx

3. What can you and your family members do?
 (a) Follow the personal e-mail guides posted on the Awareness site to change your password to ensure that messages are not

auto-forwarding to an unintended address, and to verify that other security settings are properly configured.

(b) Beware of e-mail messages that include links to password reset web pages. These can be easily faked.

(c) Create strong passwords for all of your online accounts, change them often, and never use the same password for more than one account.

(d) Avoid conducting official Department business from your personal e-mail accounts.

(e) Do not reveal your personal e-mail address in your work "Out of Office" message.

(f) Do not auto-forward Department e-mail to personal e-mail accounts, which is prohibited by Department policy (12 FAM 544.3).

4. Questions regarding cyber security awareness should be addressed to awareness@state.gov
CLINTON

Signature: CLINTON b6 per DOS
b7C per DOS

Drafted By: DS/SI/CS [REDACTED] - 06/23/11 [REDACTED]

Cleared By: DS/DSS:JCULVER, DS/SI [REDACTED] DS/SI/CS [REDACTED] DS/SI/CS [REDACTED]
AF/EX: LANDRE, WHA/EX JBERTOT, NA-SCA/EX ATEPLITZ, EUR/EX: JARBIN, EAP/EX
DCHRISTENSEN, IRM/OPS STAYLOR, IRM/A, JSTREUFERT S/ES-O: NLMACKLIN

Approved By: DS/EBOSWELL

Info:

XMT: AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI

Attachments: metadata.dat

Action Post:

Dissemination Rule: Archive Copy

UNCLASSIFIED

RELEASE IN PART
B1,1.4(G),1.4(E),B7(C),B6,1.4(D)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~
DECL: 03/02/2019

Classified by DAS, A/GIS, Dos on
2/24/2023~Class: SECRET~
Reason: 1.4(c), 1.4(e), 1.4(g)~
Declassify on: 2/24/2038

INFORMATION MEMO FOR CHERYL D. MILLS - S

FROM: DS - Eric J. Boswell

SUBJECT: Use of Blackberries in Mahogany Row

We have worked closely [redacted] to review all options that would allow Secretary Clinton, you, and a small number of staff to use Blackberries [redacted]

1.4(E)
1.4(G)
B1

[redacted] Our review reaffirms our belief that the vulnerabilities and risks associated with the use of Blackberries in the Mahogany Row [redacted] considerably outweigh the convenience their use can add to staff that have access to the unclassified OpenNet system on their desktops [redacted]

1.4(E)
1.4(G)
B1

[redacted] We also worry about the example that using Blackberries in Mahogany Row might set as we strive to promote crucial security practices and enforce important security standards among State Department staff.

b1 per DOS

As an alternative, we suggest that DS work with S/ES-IRM to make access to the Secretary's OpenNet account on her desktop workstation as easy and convenient as possible. For example, we are happy to work with IRM to lengthen or even eliminate the time-out function to allow the Secretary's Special Assistant to log-on to review her emails and schedules.

[redacted] While we cannot recommend using Blackberries inside the Mahogany Row [redacted] we do not want to stand in the way of issuing Department Blackberries to the Secretary and her senior staff for use outside Mahogany Row. Those Blackberries can be synchronized with your OpenNet Microsoft Outlook accounts, provide full cellular, e-mail, and internet functionality, and provide unclassified mobile technology when you are away from Mahogany Row.

1.4(E)
1.4(G)
B1

I cannot stress too strongly, however, that any unclassified Blackberry is highly vulnerable in any setting to remotely and covertly monitoring conversations, retrieving e-mails, and exploiting calendars. I am attaching reports from DS's

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~
Classified by: DS - Eric J. Boswell
E.O. 12958, Reasons: 1.4 (c), (d), and (e)

Ds/b

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

2

Office of Computer Security's Cyber Threat & Analysis Division that give further background on those risks [redacted]

1.4(E)
1.4(G)
B1

If, after considering the vulnerabilities that I describe above and the alternatives that I propose, the Secretary determines that she wants a limited number of staff to use Blackberries in the Mahogany Row [redacted]

1.4(E)
1.4(G)
B1Attachments:

Tab 1 - Excerpts from DS/CS/CTAD Reports on BlackBerry Vulnerabilities

Tab 2 [redacted]

Tab 3 - New York Times Article: "Obama's Phone Security and Yours"

Tab 4 - Washington Post Article: "Your Cell and Your Berry: Tools for the Enemy"

1.4(C)
1.4(E)
1.4(G)
B1~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Drafted: DS/SI/S [redacted] B6
DS/C/ST [redacted] B7(C)

Cleared: DS/DSS - G.Starr (ok)
DS/SI/CS - M.Holland (ok)
DS/SI - D.Reid (ok)
DS/C - P.Donovan (ok)
INR [redacted] (ok) B6
M [redacted] (ok) B7(C)
IRM [redacted] (ok)

From: Mills, Cheryl D
Sent: Tuesday, December 11, 2012 7:15 PM
To: Johnson, Brock A
Subject: Re: Significant FOIA Report

b6
b7C

Thanks

DOS READING ROOM:
F-2015-09700 C06402791

From: Johnson, Brock A
Sent: Tuesday, December 11, 2012 05:39 PM
To: Mills, Cheryl D
Subject: FW: Significant FOIA Report

FYI on the attached FOIA request from:

- Anne Weismann of Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington (CREW) requesting "records sufficient to show the number of email accounts of or associated with Secretary Hillary Rodham Clinton, and the extent to which those email accounts are identifiable as those of or associated with Secretary Clinton."

From: IPS-STAFF-Assistants
Sent: Tuesday, December 11, 2012 4:11 PM
To: Larkins, Neal B
Cc: Johnson, Brock A; Finney, Clarence N; Walter, Sheryl L; Reid, Rosemary D; A Staff Collective; Wasser, Jonathon D; Stein, Eric F; Davis, Jonathan E; Smilansky, Gene
Subject: Significant FOIA Report
Importance: High

All:

Attached is the Significant FOIA Report for this week. Please contact me if you have any questions.

Thank you,

Olivia Woods
Staff Assistant to the Director
U.S. Department of State
Office of Information Programs and Services
A/GIS/IPS
(202) 663-1012
SA-2, Room 5081-A

Our Mission is to meet the needs of our customers and the United States Government

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
FOI/PA
DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET
FOI/PA# 1353814-000

Total Deleted Page(s) = 72
Page 6 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C;
Page 9 ~ b5; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 10 ~ b1; b3; b5; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 11 ~ b5; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 12 ~ b5; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 13 ~ b1; b3; b5; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 14 ~ b1; b3; b5; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 15 ~ b1; b3; b5; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 16 ~ Duplicate;
Page 17 ~ Duplicate;
Page 18 ~ Duplicate;
Page 19 ~ Duplicate;
Page 20 ~ Duplicate;
Page 21 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C;
Page 22 ~ Duplicate;
Page 23 ~ Duplicate;
Page 24 ~ Duplicate;
Page 25 ~ Duplicate;
Page 26 ~ Duplicate;
Page 27 ~ Duplicate;
Page 28 ~ Duplicate;
Page 29 ~ b1; b3; b5; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 30 ~ Duplicate;
Page 32 ~ b5; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 33 ~ b1; b3; b5; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 34 ~ b5; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 35 ~ b5; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 36 ~ b1; b3; b5; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 37 ~ b1; b3; b5; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 38 ~ b1; b3; b5; b7E;
Page 39 ~ b5; b6; b7C; b7E;
Page 41 ~ Duplicate;
Page 42 ~ Duplicate;
Page 43 ~ Duplicate;
Page 44 ~ Duplicate;
Page 64 ~ Duplicate;
Page 65 ~ Duplicate;
Page 66 ~ Duplicate;
Page 67 ~ Duplicate;
Page 68 ~ Duplicate;
Page 69 ~ Duplicate;
Page 70 ~ Duplicate;
Page 71 ~ Duplicate;
Page 72 ~ Duplicate;
Page 73 ~ Duplicate;
Page 78 ~ Duplicate;
Page 79 ~ Duplicate;
Page 80 ~ Duplicate;
Page 82 ~ Duplicate;
Page 83 ~ Duplicate;
Page 89 ~ b5 - per DOS;
Page 94 ~ b5 - per DOS; b6 - per FBI, DOS; b7C;
Page 102 ~ Duplicate;
Page 105 ~ Duplicate;
Page 106 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C;
Page 110 ~ b1 - per DOS; b5 - per DOS;
Page 112 ~ b7E - per DOS;
Page 113 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C;
Page 114 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C;
Page 115 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C;
Page 116 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C;
Page 119 ~ b1 - per DOS; b5 - per DOS;
Page 122 ~ Duplicate;
Page 123 ~ Duplicate;
Page 125 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C;
Page 126 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C;
Page 127 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C;

Page 128 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C;

Page 129 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C;

Page 130 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C;

Page 131 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C;

Page 132 ~ b1; b3; b6; b7C;

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
X Deleted Page(s) X
X No Duplication Fee X
X For this Page X
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

(Cheryl Mill)

- May or may not

Lawyer

LR - planning Committee

7 1/2 yrs WH. Coun.

Q DOS. - Counse & Chief of Staff

May 2009 - PT to Full time. - Both positions entire tenure.

Counselor - policy Food Security / Haiti

Deputies - Ops / Travel

HA

JS

Policy

but separate from [redacted]

b6
b7C

Clearance - TS / Compartment

Dont recall training, but sure did prob by DS.

Retained clearance after DoS. / can retain S after office

OCA - didnt know she was one. - "they didn't
decide to declassify" tell me

COMMS -

For TS brought up in person & taken away after
review - [redacted]DoS email system not perfect system went down
Any # of reasons to use [redacted]
could have received info on [redacted] too.b6 per FBI, DoS
b7C

TAB ① Requests to change Pswd. But don't know
don't recall, but not unfamiliar
group someone says might be targeted CM told
one of them - not sure by who
[redacted] had different circumstances b/c traveling a lot. b6
common to use personal email b/c couldn't get
access b7c

TAB ② Dont recall - probably connects w/ tab 1

Dont know if changed policy perfectly.

TAB ③ sub; line Dont recall what that meant [Note: Personal -
dont recall last line either? ~~may not remember~~

Dept. conscious of need to understand federal
law - Much more conscious now.

Devices

BB - Sync'd.

not everybody @ DOS had BB but most
no other DOS devices

TRAVEL

Briefs depend on relative country - provide by DS.

Transition

Role - Help ID Sec. Priorities ID Individuals for staff
ensure transition took into account how to
balance her life w/ transition

No rec. of discussions of IT Infrastructure

TAB 4 Recal issue.

SEA - See used BB/not computer. Wanted way for Sec.
to communicate while in DAS Mahog. Rm.

NSA - indicated a possibly tech existed so researched
outcome - was ability but DAS didn't feel it
could be implemented @ DDC.

BB not used in SCIF.

didn't know about waiver for. Rice

Goal - was for Sec b/c she didn't have a comp.
but not sure of other 4

Since DS provided briefing on security risks

TAB 7

Dont recall, but not unfamiliar

in ~~SCIF~~ line w/

Inaccurate - about using BB in sensitive spaces

Advised not to use BB in SCIF - not one w/
voice / disabled.

to check email - would leave

but most info on phone / face to face

"please print."

Not aware of anyone w/ access to HRC email.
don't know where stored

TAB 8 Remember not able to get on BB
more of a continuation of what she had
conversations since
subj to FOIA if knew name looking for.
could have known / personal email known / server
not known

TAB 9 Do remember context.
How would she check BB if not
Standalone - not a possibility - couldn't use a computer.
tried to create best flow to Secretary
CM would forward
Office connected.
~~as a general matter no concerns for handling~~
~~unclass~~

~~Server~~
Devices
AT&T BB - Email associated w/ AT&T ^{when 1st came on}
a few months
transitioned over to @clintonemail
don't know why - just heardized transition
~~disposition~~ not aware of anyone @ the time
responsible for transition / DOS or outside

Practice to email on Dos.gov when doing
DOS records business

Not aware of any efforts to archive while
@ DOS for Fed Records Retention or otherwise

Bryan Pag - quite possible conversations about FRA
Understanding was everything at
Met w/ Br Pag a lot trying to bring

I had received for news articles - dont know if
- not aware of who set up @ DOS. She emailed from device

don't recall ^{sec} w/ a flip phone.
only ① ^{telephone} # for HRC

During Sandy - people called / in person.

don't recall any temporary accounts during that time

Server / Records

Front office understanding of maintaining records.

Dec 2012 FOIA request - aware now but
don't know if recall @ time

Significant FOIA made executives aware.

Wasn't typical to respond to FOIA / not realm.

Can't say who FOIA response fell on

Confirmed Classified Emails

TAB 14 Remember event. (see outline)

could have called - standard / not standard

TAB 15 (see outline)

TAB 16

Don't know why he would send. (see outline)

PC - its planning involvement & participation
(depending on topic)

(from recall)

[redacted] Report - not familiar

[redacted] don't know who would have drafted
General Orders

[redacted] something might start in unclass & later document
not sure who decided for policy related matters

b6
b7c

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG [redacted]
REASON 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2036
DATE: 03-28-2024

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

[redacted] b6
b7C

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-27-2018 BY [redacted] NSICG

Cheryl Mills Interview Outline – Tenure with Department of State

[redacted] b5
b7E

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG [REDACTED]
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2036
DATE: 03-28-2024

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-27-2018 BY [REDACTED] NSICG

b6
b7C

Cheryl Mills Interview Outline – Tenure with Department of State

b5
b7E

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG

REASON: 1.4 (C)

DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2041

DATE: 03-28-2024

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

DECLASSIFIED BY: NSICG
ON 11-27-2018

b6

b7C

b1

b3

File Number

[Redacted]

-302

b3
b7E

(IA 19)

Field Office Acquiring Evidence

Serial # of Originating Document

Date Received 3/2/2016

From

(Name of Contributor/Interviewee)

(Address)

b6
b7C

(City and State)

By SA

(SA)

To Be Returned Yes No

Receipt Given Yes No

Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6 (c)
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure

Yes No

Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI)

Yes No

MIDYEAR EXAM;
MISHANDLING OF CLASSIFIED

Reference:

(Communication Enclosing Material)

Description: Original notes re interview of
Hillary Clinton

b1
b3

OFORF

HRC-12456



U.S. Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of Investigation

601 4th Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20535

CLASSIFIED INFORMATION NON-DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

I, Katherine M. Turner, certify that on this date,
[redacted], I was informed by Special Agent(s) of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) of a sensitive national security matter. I understand that disclosure of any classified
information related to this matter is strictly prohibited.

I understand that the United States Government may seek any remedy available to it to enforce
this agreement.

I understand that the unauthorized disclosure, unauthorized retention, or negligent handling of
classified information related to this matter by me could cause damage or irreparable injury to the United
States or could be used to advantage by a foreign nation. I further understand that I am obligated to
comply with laws and regulations that prohibit the unauthorized disclosure of classified information.

I understand that all classified information related to this matter is now and will remain the
property of, or under the control of, the United States Government unless and until otherwise determined
by an authorized official or final ruling of a court of law.

These provisions are consistent with and do not supersede, conflict with, or otherwise alter
employee obligations, rights or liabilities created by existing statute or Executive order relating to:
(1) classified information; (2) communications to Congress; (3) the reporting to an Inspector General of a
violation of any law, rule, or regulation or of mismanagement, gross waste of funds, abuse of authority, or
of a substantial and specific danger to the public health or safety; or (4) any other whistleblower
protection. The definitions, requirements, obligations, rights, sanctions, and liabilities created by
controlling Executive orders and statutory provisions are incorporated into this agreement and are
controlling.

Unless and until I am released in writing by the FBI, I understand that all conditions and
obligations imposed upon me by this agreement apply during this interview and at all times thereafter.

Date of Birth

7/2/16

Date

b6
b7C



U.S. Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of Investigation

601 4th Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20535

CLASSIFIED INFORMATION NON-DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

I [redacted], certify that on this date,
7/2/16, I was informed by Special Agent(s) of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) of a sensitive national security matter. I understand that disclosure of any classified information related to this matter is strictly prohibited.

I understand that the United States Government may seek any remedy available to it to enforce this agreement.

I understand that the unauthorized disclosure, unauthorized retention, or negligent handling of classified information related to this matter by me could cause damage or irreparable injury to the United States or could be used to advantage by a foreign nation. I further understand that I am obligated to comply with laws and regulations that prohibit the unauthorized disclosure of classified information.

I understand that all classified information related to this matter is now and will remain the property of, or under the control of, the United States Government unless and until otherwise determined by an authorized official or final ruling of a court of law.

These provisions are consistent with and do not supersede, conflict with, or otherwise alter employee obligations, rights or liabilities created by existing statute or Executive order relating to: (1) classified information; (2) communications to Congress; (3) the reporting to an Inspector General of a violation of any law, rule, or regulation or of mismanagement, gross waste of funds, abuse of authority, or of a substantial and specific danger to the public health or safety; or (4) any other whistleblower protection. The definitions, requirements, obligations, rights, sanctions, and liabilities created by controlling Executive orders and statutory provisions are incorporated into this agreement and are controlling.

Unless and until I am released in writing by the FBI, I understand that all conditions and obligations imposed upon me by this agreement apply during this interview and at all times thereafter.

b6
b7C

[redacted]
Date of Birth

7/2/16
Date

b6
b7C



U.S. Department of Justice

Federal Bureau of Investigation

601 4th Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 2053

CLASSIFIED INFORMATION NON-DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

I, Heather Samuelson, certify that on this date,
July 2, 2016, I was informed by Special Agent(s) of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) of a sensitive national security matter. I understand that disclosure of any classified
information related to this matter is strictly prohibited.

I understand that the United States Government may seek any remedy available to it to enforce
this agreement.

I understand that the unauthorized disclosure, unauthorized retention, or negligent handling of
classified information related to this matter by me could cause damage or irreparable injury to the United
States or could be used to advantage by a foreign nation. I further understand that I am obligated to
comply with laws and regulations that prohibit the unauthorized disclosure of classified information.

I understand that all classified information related to this matter is now and will remain the
property of, or under the control of, the United States Government unless and until otherwise determined
by an authorized official or final ruling of a court of law.

These provisions are consistent with and do not supersede, conflict with, or otherwise alter
employee obligations, rights or liabilities created by existing statute or Executive order relating to:
(1) classified information; (2) communications to Congress; (3) the reporting to an Inspector General of a
violation of any law, rule, or regulation or of mismanagement, gross waste of funds, abuse of authority, or
of a substantial and specific danger to the public health or safety; or (4) any other whistleblower
protection. The definitions, requirements, obligations, rights, sanctions, and liabilities created by
controlling Executive orders and statutory provisions are incorporated into this agreement and are
controlling.

Unless and until I am released in writing by the FBI, I understand that all conditions and
obligations imposed upon me by this agreement apply during this interview and at all times thereafter.

Heather Samuelson
Date of Birth7/2/16

Date

b6
b7C



U.S. Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of Investigation

601 4th Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20530

CLASSIFIED INFORMATION NON-DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

I, J. A. [redacted], certify that on this date,

[redacted], I was informed by Special Agent(s) of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) of a sensitive national security matter. I understand that disclosure of any classified information related to this matter is strictly prohibited.

I understand that the United States Government may seek any remedy available to it to enforce this agreement.

I understand that the unauthorized disclosure, unauthorized retention, or negligent handling of classified information related to this matter by me could cause damage or irreparable injury to the United States or could be used to advantage by a foreign nation. I further understand that I am obligated to comply with laws and regulations that prohibit the unauthorized disclosure of classified information.

I understand that all classified information related to this matter is now and will remain the property of, or under the control of, the United States Government unless and until otherwise determined by an authorized official or final ruling of a court of law.

These provisions are consistent with and do not supersede, conflict with, or otherwise alter employee obligations, rights or liabilities created by existing statute or Executive order relating to:
(1) classified information; (2) communications to Congress; (3) the reporting to an Inspector General of a violation of any law, rule, or regulation or of mismanagement, gross waste of funds, abuse of authority, or of a substantial and specific danger to the public health or safety; or (4) any other whistleblower protection. The definitions, requirements, obligations, rights, sanctions, and liabilities created by controlling Executive orders and statutory provisions are incorporated into this agreement and are controlling.

Unless and until I am released in writing by the FBI, I understand that all conditions and obligations imposed upon me by this agreement apply during this interview and at all times thereafter.

J. A. [redacted]

[redacted]

Date of Birth

1/12/16
Date

[redacted]

b6
b7C

卷之三

NAME OF DIVISION OR SECTION

7/2/2016

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

b6
b7C

HRC-12468

HRC/CM/11/OK/KT

- Main State - several places - reg - black [redacted] - white [redacted]
 - no computer [redacted]
- Whitehaven - V(Confidential) (unclassified) black [redacted] - yellow [redacted]
 [redacted] combo lock - small safe - large safe
 - I had combo only - serve ref w/ 1 left residence
 - I rarely used DC [redacted] phone calls. [redacted]
- NY - Fax - email - picture same
 No Computer.

b7E per DOS

 - Bush bag is [redacted] for clear print.
- Domestic - No support with treasury - in person - [redacted]
 - In paper.
- International - usual protocol - depending upon country
 [redacted]
 - verbal
 - Some briefings - [redacted] everything on
 the plane. Up security to set up rooms
 - 2nd para - That why we left - 1/left DB Reg.
 - I never took it off the plane -
- Don't recall guidance - about
- Don't recall clearance specifically - don't know how did State
- Don't recall briefings or handling - O/H
- Don't recall briefings or handling - Joe
- No State guidance on records retention.
- Tab 4 - personal correspondence vs official. Senate had official vs personal.
 No guidance - My way.

b6
b7C

- No knowledge of SMART system.
- I was aware I was an OCA as Cof.
 - Don't recall frequency.
 - Determination of class - don't recall.
- I relied professionals & make those determinations.
 - No guidance of Declaratory - Don't recall doing that.
- Don't recall ability of CA - Some - Circumstances required.
 - Situation room discussions here.
 -
- SAP briefing - Don't recall. Any process. Counter would bring paper. Someone would come to my office.
 - I'm sure I signed papers. No process.

b1
b3

Mobile - DDCI didn't issue - I brought Senate.

- Tried to get secure. No.
- Continued practice - convenience - Powell - used private. Others before him.
- Password on BB - I don't recall how many BB.
- This looks like number on BB - Said "flip phone a 'no cargo'"
 - Senate time.
- Don't recall at State
- Think it's # on BB
- BB
- Process to get BB - aides would help me.
 - after SIM was taken out disposed of b, aides.
 - don't recall how data was destroyed.
- Don't recall security.
 - relied on someone else to do that
- No tampering with. - Never lost.
- Few occasions rarely team provided with a secure cell phone.
 - No knowledge of staff - don't know how many times.
- Secure phone - don't recall how or why it didn't happen.
 - few had one. - seemed convenient.
 - not concerned about an agency device. Future - what long?

- wire & have seen photo.
- never brought BD in [redacted] not that I recall.
Tab 7 - not recommended for all reasons outlined.
- BD during the day. Drives, speech, outside office.
- I don't recall ever feeling that it shouldn't be on work system.
 - Relied on DSS officials.
 - Never raised concerns - 8:30 meeting with staff - contact with in talk-out meeting.
- 2 - att address - set up on BD - Senate the password ad offical.
 - Cooper registration problem - wasn't focused on it - don't recall.
 - reffed at convenience - husband staff. I don't recall communicating with others. At some point learned as system - since book advised before RP.
 - Powell email - I don't want to guess precisely - if you use a common device for official business.
 - Petraeus Email - didn't continue & receive it att. Not that I recall.
 - Some had access to BD. Don't recall.
 - Process for deletion. Work related emails to state.gov.
 - Justin Cooper set up for you.
 - Size restrictions.
 - it email was backed up so
 - No receipt protocols. I'm aware of
 - occasional odd looking emails.
 - Co - home w/ my son in Denmark. - Personal matters.
 - other account ad declining.
 - who is State? - everyone involved with several hundred.

b7E per DOS

- Others communicated thru top level staff.
- recipient could be determine if it should go to me.
 - no one expressed concern to me.
- Other personal email practice to state.gov - would want to forward it state.gov over doamin.
- I'm not aware of hacking or intrusions of ~~over~~ around D- function with system -
 - Don't recall.
- Personal policy on email - not preferred - send to State.gov email account.
- Tab 12 - Can't say. All cables go out with name of Sec. to stat.
 - No correlation with BP.
 - Consider switching to state.gov - recall reports of hacking into state.gov.
 - I don't recall deleting emails - like me I did.
 - FAM - don't recall that?
 - I don't recall
 - Didn't agree at State tell you you could use personal email.
 - Don't recall you knowing about.
 - Regulations - Personal emails/system. - Don't know about hacking.
 - Never been breached.
 - Inquiries security protocols - My understanding that email set-up by husband had excellent record.
 - I relied on him prior to send the right thing
- 3 - who approved move to server - don't know.
 - don't recall why BP - assume Justice Cooper.

b6 per DOS

- why installed in b/w system?
- no thought of commercial provider.
- don't recall.
- secure against intrusions.
- General Powell -
- No conversations with anybody FOIA. I thought it could be in the system.
- Don't recall knowing [redacted] or communication.
- Don't recall conversation about security.
 - I would reach out to Justice Lawyer. - More operational of the Service.
 - I don't recall reaching out to BP.
- No backups. Don't know.
- Save car down? - There is issue - cell phone got kewl / SD down
 - was able to communicate on iPad.
 - remember email containing issue.
- Don't recall mini iPad still after. No notebook or laptop.

b6
b7C

Sid - long time friend. Frequent interaction - conversations related. Would read and forward to appropriate people. I know [redacted] b3 b6 per FBI, DOS b7C per FBI, DOS b7E

other - no concern at classified sources. Journalistic.

- He doesn't read - he - No one currently in government.

- Propaganda writer - don't recall specifically. I think some of his info

was not accurate - some leads were worth pursuing.

- Counter-Intelligence - Some went to try to get into an Egypt.

OCA - 15 - Don't recall it. - Speculation - he was working at DOD [redacted] before.

I do not have a source. [redacted] b7L regard - did not want to rely on him.

b3
b6
b7C
b7E

Tab 16

Don't recall

b1
b3

Tab 17 - Don't recall specific instance.

- Specifically - looking at names - own forename and family's
- didn't see news.

b1
b3

Tab 18 - Didn't see frequency - name already ranked. Discussion
deliberation document. Try to determine response. I relied
on judgement of people in the thick. No reason to not do so.
- don't recall M's email frequency.

Tab 19 - Don't recall specifically. CA - let me know what you can
via this channel. 'No concern' H? No concern. This
is State deliberated

b1
b3

Tab 20 - I don't recall specifically. Don't know context. No reason
to do it - SPU - front lines - people sandy it.

Tab 21

Don't recall specifically.

b1
b3

Tab 22

Tab 22 - Don't recall specifically. Can't answer that it always did. "PL".

- process around holidays. Necessary to communicate in code, figured out
what happened, but they could.

Tab 23 - Don't recall specific email

b1
b3

Tab 24: Non-pgr - no classify mark - no connection with a government.

can be given to foreign government. Go back 2-3 years.

No classified - could be used for talking point.

No DDCI letterhead - No info. No retention & review classification marking.

Tab 25: Irrelevant not specific email.

(C) I would have to speculate - referencing paragraphs that would be put in alphabetical order.

(C) Can't tell you for sure if that's used. It says Classified I don't know if that's why.

- Nothing that I find classified. Confidence call.

- You are aware of TS, S, C - I'm not.

- didn't pay attention to level - took it seriously

- I'm a sucker. Be extra careful

b1
b3

Tab 24- Not always classified talking points.

- No specific recollection that non-pgmr was sent
- Principal meetings talking points are typically classified.
- Do not recall

Tab 22- Other info about leaders for S.D.R. Corruption pointed out, etc.

- Pakistan gov sometimes provides information.
- Don't rec that this could have added more fuel to a by fire.
(M, F- could convey information - By thought it over SDO)
- no state.gov account - no class account
- in person, meetings, paper - phone call.

During your tenure, did you raise concerns regarding your
use of a personal email account? I do not recall you
ever? I do not recall anyone

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

HRC-12479

7/2/2016 - Hillary Clinton

5 records - no instructions or directions from State. Concussion in Dec 2012, then blood clot. Could only be @ State a few hours/day.

- Physical records boxed up - handled by aides.
- Did not discuss turning over email @ that time - not asked. Believed work being captured by sendings to govt. Didn't know printed record required.

(^{REC}
28)

- Does not recall request. Not aware of FOIA related to HRC email account. Knew of FOIA dept @ State - relied on them.
never came to HRC

b7E per DOS

- State took all [redacted] equip shortly after Taiwan
- No memory of read-out clearances
- hrc22 → hrc17 - Blumenthal hack - changed address
 - was advised to change address - no memory of who advised.

- doesn't know who made change
- no memory of access to old email or not
- no awareness of archive created
- no memory of emails deleted at that time
- no knowledge of laptop or thumb drive
- does not know if staff accessed email to write hard choices
- PRN - unaware of movement of email
- no knowledge of PRN using personal gmail account
- aware of others who have archive

(7) • Move to PRN - husband's staff worked different level of service. Handled through his addy - [redacted]

b6
b7c

- Federal records no memory of discussion
- doesn't know from in the
- no knowledge of movement
- no reason for 500

(8) • State request - Fall 2014. Letter sent to Sec. Powell, Rice, Albright

- State concerned gaps in their preservation, so asked for help. HRC wanted to help, so directed lawyers to assist.
- Not aware of July or Sept. requests refer to PRN.

- not aware of laptop deletions
- not involved in discussions of process
- not aware of sources checked for email
- HRC expected anything work related or arguably work related would be turned over to State.
- Did not develop or give guidance on method for cull down
- No memory of consulted on specific emails as work related.
- HA - scheduling - No knowledge why exclusive HA small

(2)

- Recalled WikiLeaks - spent time on phone
 - no knowledge of why wouldn't be in the 30
 - would expect to be turned over

- 62k - unaware of current existence
- 30k - unaware
- 32k - unaware
- After production to State over - doesn't need email anymore
- No knowledge on process/EC - trusted attorneys
- Classified - did not send/rec. marked classifi
 - No conversations, b/c didn't think was going there

• Retention policy change - part of change
to personal office

DEC 30
JAN 31

• Congressional preservation > PPN - trusted
lawyers would comply.

• No knowledge of inventory request

• No knowledge of instruction to PPN to
delete PST or hrcarchive mailbox. March 25th

• Not aware of ^{No} instructions to delete to
avoid FOIA, FRA, state, FBI requests.

• hroffice.com domain ~~move~~ → had personal
staff, but no office or common email acct

• decided to move to common email acct.
+ physical office

• no memory of sending/receiving email on clintonemail.com
after moving to hroffice.com.

• no memory of continued access to clintonmail.com

CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG

REASON: 1.4 (C)

DECLASSIFY ON: 12-31-2037

DATE: 03-28-2024

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

ALL FED INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-27-2018 BY [redacted] NSICG

b1

b3

From: Mills, Cheryl D <MillsCD@state.gov>
Sent: Saturday, October 13, 2012 10:11 AM
To: H
Subject: Fw: This am Green on Blue

Classified by DAS, A/GIS, DoS on 01/29/2016
~Class: SECRET ~ Reason: 1.4(C), 1.4(D) ~
Declassify on: 10/12/2027

----- Original Message -----

From: Reines, Philippe I
Sent: Saturday, October 13, 2012 09:53 AM
To: Mills, Cheryl D; Sullivan, Jacob J
Subject: Fw: This am Green on Blue

----- Original Message -----

From: Bash, Jeremy CIV SD [mailto:[redacted]]
Sent: Saturday, October 13, 2012 09:45 AM
To: Little, George CIV OSD PA [redacted] Reines, Philippe I
Cc: Kelly, John LtGen SD [redacted] Waldhauser, Thomas LtGen SD [redacted]
Subject: This am Green on Blue

b6
b7C

As you'll be hearing from ISAF, an Afghan NDS officer pulled the ripcord on a vest in front of coalition guys loading a helicopter. Total of 14 either killed or wounded -- some US, some Afghans.

Right now, we think 1 US mil killed and one wounded.

George, please lash up with [redacted]

b1 per FBI, DOS
b3
b6 per DOS

b1
b3

HRC-12497

From: "Mills, Cheryl D" <SBUSTATE/SES/RECIPIENTS/MILLSCD>
Sent: 2/13/2009 4:42:37 PM +00:00
To: 'hdr22@clintonemail.com'
Subject: FW: Update

[redacted]
DOS READING ROOM:
F-2015-06322/C0590100

HRC:

See below

Remind me to discuss with you, particularly should they pull this off

b3 per DOS
b6 per DOS

In meeting with the NSA person today [redacted] NSA's rep to DOS) ~ she indicated they could address our BB so that BB could work in the scif and be secure based upon some modifications that could be done to each BB (more below).

cdm

From: [redacted]
Sent: Friday, February 13, 2009 11:08 AM
To: Mills, Cheryl D
Cc: McLean, Lori A [redacted]
Subject: Update

b3 per DOS
b6 per DOS

Cheryl,

--Debbie Plunkett, D/Chief of our Information Assurance Directorate, is personally assembling a knowledgeable team to work with you and other members of your staff to move forward on your Blackberry requirement. She will engage State's CIO and DS/comms security folks to ensure everyone is aware of the art of the possible. She asked me to provide dates/times when you may be available to meet - I will ask my Executive Assistant [redacted] to work with Lori to make this happen. *I am confident we can get to YES on this!*

--The reports we discussed are at a higher level than can be forwarded on the high side, so we will deliver them to your office today (our reporting staff is retrieving them now)

b3 per DOS
b6 per DOS

Thank you so much for making the time for Dick and me today. All the best. [redacted]

PR_RIM_INTERNET_MESS
AGE_ID:
PR_RIM_MSG_REF_ID:
PR_RIM_MESSAGE_SUBMISSION_ID:

[redacted]
state.sou>
[redacted]

b7E per DOS

RELEASE IN PART
B1,1.4(G),1.4(E),B7(C),B6,1.4(C)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~
DECL: 03/02/2019

Classified by DAS, A/GIS, DoS, on
2/24/2023 ~ Class, SECRET
~Reason 1.4(c), 1.4(e), 1.4(g) ~
Declassify on: 2/24/2026

INFORMATION MEMO FOR CHERYL D. MILES - S

FROM: DS - Eric J. Boswell

SUBJECT: Use of Blackberries in Mahogany Row

1.4(E)
1.4(G)
B1

We have worked closely [redacted] to review all options that would allow Secretary Clinton, you, and a small number of staff to use Blackberries [redacted]

[redacted] We review reaffirms our belief that the vulnerabilities and risks associated with the use of Blackberries in the Mahogany Row [redacted] considerably outweigh the convenience their use can add to staff that have access to the unclassified OpenNet system on their desktops [redacted]

b1 per DOS

1.4(E)
1.4(G)
B1

[redacted] we also worry about the example that using Blackberries in Mahogany Row might set as we strive to promote crucial security practices and enforce important security standards among State Department staff.

As an alternative, we suggest that DS work with S/ES-IRM to make access to the Secretary's OpenNet account on her desktop workstation as easy and convenient as possible. For example, we are happy to work with IRM to lengthen or even eliminate the time-out function to allow the Secretary's Special Assistant to log-on to review her emails and schedules.

While we cannot recommend using Blackberries inside the Mahogany Row [redacted] we do not want to stand in the way of issuing Department Blackberries to the Secretary and her senior staff for use outside Mahogany Row. Those [redacted] Blackberries can be synchronized with your OpenNet Microsoft Outlook accounts, provide full cellular, e-mail, and internet functionality, and provide unclassified mobile technology when you are away from Mahogany Row.

1.4(E)
1.4(G)
b1 per DOS
31

I cannot stress too strongly, however, that any unclassified BlackBerry is highly vulnerable in any setting to remotely and covertly monitoring conversations, retrieving e-mails, and exploiting calendars. I am attaching reports from DS's

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Classified by: DS - Eric J. Boswell
E.O. 12958; Reasons: 1.4 (c), (d), and (e)

DJS/DP

-2-

Office of Computer Security's Cyber Threat & Analysis Division that give further background on those risks

1.4(E)

1.4(G)

B1



If, after considering the vulnerabilities that I describe above and the alternatives that I propose, the Secretary determines that she wants a limited number of staff to use Blackberries in the Mahogany Row

1.4(E)

1.4(G)

B1

Attachments:

Tab 1 - Excerpts from DS/CS/CTAD Reports on BlackBerry Vulnerabilities

Tab 2

Tab 3 - New York Times Article: "Obama's Phone Security and Yours"

Tab 4 - Washington Post Article: "Your Cell and Your Berry: Tools for the Enemy"

1.4(C)

1.4(E)

1.4(G)

B1

Drafted: DS/SI/S
DS/C/ST

B6
B7(C)

Cleared: DS/DSS - G.Starr (ok)
DS/SI/CS - M.Holland (ok)
DS/SI - D.Reid (ok)
DS/C - P.Donovan (ok)
INR [redacted] (ok)
M [redacted] (ok)
IRM [redacted] (ok)

b6 per DOS
b7C per DOS

B6
B7(C)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

b6
b7C

From: H <hrod17@clintonemail.com>

DOS READING ROOM
C06187054/C06174690 in
F-2016-07895

Sent: 8/22/2011 2:52:37 PM +00:00

To: Oscar Flores <Oscar@presidentclinton.com>

Subject: Fw: Quint call readout

Classified by: DAS, A/GIS.
DOS on 9/30/2015 ~ Class.
CONFIDENTIAL ~ Reason
1.4(b), 1.4(d) ~ Declassify
on 8/23/2026

Please print

From: Sullivan, Jacob J [mailto:SullivanJJ@state.gov]

Sent: Monday, August 22, 2011 10:38 AM

To: H

Subject: FW: Quint call readout

DOS READING ROOM
C05786844/C05762118 in
F-2014-20439

For the Quint call, this is a readout of the morning. We will get you paper in the next 45 minutes.

From: Gordon, Philip H

Sent: Monday, August 22, 2011 09:24 AM

To: Sullivan, Jacob J; Dibble, Elizabeth L; Abedin, Huma; Burns, William J;

[redacted] Feltman, Jeffrey D [redacted]

b6 per DOS

Cc: Hanley, Monica R; S_SpecialAssistants; Kimbrell, Rebecca J; Shapiro, Jeremy

Subject: RE: Quint call readout

Quick readout from 8 a.m. Quint Poldirs conf call.

- Others agree to an 1130 EST conf call, including with Turkey, UAE, Qatar, Canada, Denmark, Norway, Sweden and Jordan. Quint ministers available (except Hague) but need to reach out to the others.

[redacted]
b5 per DOS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

From: Anne-Marie Slaughter [redacted] **DOS READING ROOM:**
Sent: Saturday, June 4, 2011 11:00 AM C05780317(F-2014-20439)
To: Mills, Cheryl D; H [redacted] **b6 per FBI, DOS**
Cc: Abedin, Huma; Sullivan, Jacob J **b7C**
Subject: RE: Google email hacking and woeful state of civilian technology

I take this point – Jake also has concerns. Perhaps a better approach is to make the point more quietly to legislators through H. AM

From: Mills, Cheryl D [mailto:MillsCD@state.gov]
Sent: Saturday, June 04, 2011 5:52 AM **b6 per FBI, DOS**
To: hdr22@clintonemail.com [redacted]
Cc: Abedin, Huma; Sullivan, Jacob J
Subject: Re: Google email hacking and woeful state of civilian technology

I think this is easier to do as a former employee rather than current; second and more significantly, as someone who attempted to be hacked (yes I was one). I am not sure we want to telegraph how much folks do or don't do off state mail b/c it may encourage others who are out there.

From: H [mailto:HDR22@clintonemail.com]
Sent: Friday, June 03, 2011 07:27 PM **b6 per FBI, DOS**
To: [redacted]
Cc: Abedin, Huma; Mills, Cheryl D; Sullivan, Jacob J
Subject: Re: Google email hacking and woeful state of civilian technology

AM- I think this makes good sense. How should we follow up?

From: Anne-Marie Slaughter [mailto:[redacted]] **b6 per FBI, DOS**
Sent: Friday, June 03, 2011 10:35 AM **b7C**
To: H
Cc: Abedin, Huma <AbedinH@state.gov>; Mills, Cheryl D <MillsCD@state.gov>; Sullivan, Jacob J <SullivanJJ@state.gov>
Subject: Google email hacking and woeful state of civilian technology

I'm sure you've thought of this, but it would be a great time for someone inside or outside to make a statement/ write an op-ed that points out that State's technology is so antiquated that NO ONE uses a State-issued laptop and even high officials routinely end up using their home email accounts to be able to get their work done quickly and effectively. Further cuts to State's budget just makes matters much much worse. We actually need more funds to significantly upgrade our technology. AM

From: "Macmanus, Joseph E" <CLASSTATE/CBPC ADMINISTRATIVE GROUP/RECIPIENTS/MACMANUSJE>
Sent: 10/6/2009 6:07:49 PM +00:00
To: "Mills, Cheryl D" <MillsCD@state.sgov.gov>; "Sullivan, Jacob J" <SullivanJJ@state.sgov.gov>; "Abedin, Huma" <AbedinH@state.sgov.gov>
Subject: IT security in Moscow

b6
b7C

Our Mobile Communications Team sent in an email on electronic surveillance and monitoring in Russia, which I've excerpted below. The gist of it is: what's yours is theirs.

We will brief staff at the airport before departure, and post the necessary warnings in the hotel.

From: Mobile Communications Team, Moscow Advance
Sent: Tuesday, October 06, 2009 10:40 AM
Subject: IT security in Moscow

b7E per DOS

Yesterday at the RSO's security briefing, the RSO stated that the IT threat level here in Moscow currently [redacted]

The following are recommendations regarding IT security in Moscow:

b7E per DOS

Strong recommendation against any classified material or conversations in the hotel, including STE conversations and any printed materials, whether brought to the hotel by the party or delivered by courier. No matter how well [redacted]

[redacted] The Secretary's suite as well as the Senior Bureau, the Secretariat, and all bedrooms will be [redacted]

Strong recommendation against the use of BlackBerries; when you bring your BlackBerry online in Moscow

Strong recommendation against computers connected to the Internet in the hotel,

Authorized the use of FOBs in the hotel ONLY for use with government-owned laptops under 100% continuous positive control by a cleared American.

NOTE: a lost or stolen FOB here in Moscow is a major security threat. All must take great care not to lose their FOBs.

DS Lead and DS Logistics indicated that they did not want computers and printers in their bedrooms per the IT requirements and would rather work in the Embassy. The laptops intended for them are being stored in the Embassy.

Communications set-up in Moscow:

b7E per DOS

Computers issued by MCT or supported by MCT (e.g., Abedin, Sullivan, Macmanus) will

the Marines and DS will restrict access. Anyone in a bedroom outside of the [redacted] must keep their laptops in their possession at all times

store them at the Embassy (for example in [redacted])

b7E per DOS

Computers we set up in S offices and bedrooms will be laptops owned by the Embassy and will remain in our custody while outside of the Embassy. The traveling party should be notified that we will have to use laptops instead of desktops at this stop.

STEs in the S suite; the Secretary should be briefed [redacted]

RSO recommends courier of documents to the hotel [redacted]

RSO permits use BlackBerries. AS SOON AS users return to Washington, their Blackberry will need to be cleaned [redacted]

Any government laptop used in the hotel and returned to Washington will need to be [redacted]

The use of a personal computer is not recommended [redacted]

b6 per FBI, DOS
b7C

UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2015-06322 Doc No. C05956435 Date: 05/31/2016

b6

b7C

Autoforwarded by Outlook Web Access

From: Huma Abedin
Sent: Sunday, March 22, 2009 11:57 AM
To: hdr22@clintonemail.com; JilolyLC@state.gov
Subject: Re: Follow up

B6

RELEASE IN PART
B6

We've discussed this.
I can explain to you when I see u today.

-- Original Message-----

From: H hdr22@clintonemail.com>
To: Huma Abedin, Lauren Jiloly <JilolyLC@state.gov>
Sent: Sun Mar 22 08:58:21 2009
Subject: Follow up

Dear Lauren and Huma--

I have just realized I have no idea how my papers are being treated at State. Who manages both my personal and official files?

I am sending out material the way I did w Lauren in the Senate, but I don't know what's happening w it all. For instance, I've sent a few things to Cheryl but she says she hasn't read them. Does Cheryl manage this or does it all go to Joe? Are there personal files as well as official ones set up? If I don't write anything on a paper--as I mostly don't--Lauren knew how to file it all in the Senate. I'm sending out a svcs which sometimes Cheryl and other times Lauren picks up from the out box. What happens then is a mystery to me!

So I think we need to get on this snap to be sure we know and design the system we want. Let me know what you both think. Thx

HA 09/01/2015
UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2015-06322 Doc No. C05956435 Date: 05/31/2016

HRC-12511

From: diane22@clintonemail.com
Sent: 01/27/09 11:16 AM -05:00
To: Diane Reynolds
Subject: Re: New cell

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED b6
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED b7C
DATE 11-27-2018 BY [redacted] Ns100

I just got my voice mail set up today so IIS my again. But during the day, call my office if you want to reach me. This cell [redacted]

b6 per DOS

From: "Diane Reynolds"
Date: wed, 11 feb 2009 15:07:00 -05:00
To: hdr22@clintonemail.com
Subject: Re: New cell

All IIS left a message for you at the # below earlier this week and just tried you now but no one and sadly can't even leave a message. Hope we talk soon.
I love you
xxx

... Original Message:
From: H <hdr22@clintonemail.com>
To: Diane Reynolds
Sent: Sun Feb 08 07:04:12 2009
Subject: New cell

Here's my new # for you and Mark [redacted] use it often!! I love you, googles. Mom

b6 per DOS

Message Headers:

[redacted]
Reply To: hdr22@clintonemail.com

b6 per DOS
b7E per DOS

To: Diane Reynolds [redacted]
Subject: Re: New cell
From: "H" <hdr22@clintonemail.com>
Date: Thu 12 Feb 2009 07:11:16 -0000

PR_RIM_PAGER_TX_FLAG:
PR_RIM_MSG_REF_ID:
PR_RIM_MSG_FOLDER_ID:
PR_RIM_DELETED_BY_DEVICE
PR_RIM_MSG_ON_DEVICE_3_S:
PR_RIM_MSG_STATUS:

{.3i}

To: "David Petraeus"
Subject: Re: Follow up
From: "H"
Date: Sun, 1 Feb 2009 22:20:10 +0000

DP--we're working this but waiting for a DOD \$ commitment to put on the table. I should have that tomorrow. I'll keep you informed. H

-----Original Message-----

From: "Petraeus, David H. GEN USA"

Date: Fri, 30 Jan 2009 15:09:58

To: "H"

Subject: RE: Follow up

Thx, Madame Secretary. And thx for the phone call that [redacted]

[redacted] b5 per DOS

[redacted] Best - Dave

-----Original Message-----

From: H [mailto:hdr22_a@clintonemail.com]

Sent: Wednesday, January 28, 2009 9:33 PM

To: Petraeus, David H. GEN USA

Subject: Re: Follow up

David--Sorry to be so tardy in responding. I've had blackberry blues. I can't use mine all day long since my whole office is a SCIF. I don't yet have a computer and I had to change my address and lost some of my traffic [redacted]

[redacted] b5 per DOS

[redacted] All the best.

-----Original Message-----

From: "Petraeus, David H. GEN USA"

Date: Sun, 25 Jan 2009 07:55:52

To: "H"

Subject: RE: Follow up

Madame Sec: Thx again [redacted]

[redacted] b5 per DOS

[Redacted]
[Redacted] Break. Strongly recommend

that [Redacted]

b5 per DOS

[Redacted] Vr - Dave

-----Original Message-----

From: hr15@att.blackberry.net [<mailto:hr15@att.blackberry.net>]

Sent: Sunday, January 18, 2009 1:46 PM

To: Petraeus, David H. GEN USA

Subject: Re: Follow up

Glad it worked out. Look forward to talking w you after the 20th.

-----Original Message-----

From: David Petraeus

To: Hillary Clinton

Sent: Jan 18, 2009 6:24 AM

Subject: RE: Follow up

Thx for making it happen in Saudi Arabia. Amb Fraker has been asked to stay on until April to help with transition. Great news -

-----Original Message-----

From: hr15@att.blackberry.net [<mailto:hr15@att.blackberry.net>]

Sent: Wednesday, January 14, 2009 9:23 PM

To: Petraeus, David H. GEN USA

Subject: Re: Follow up

I asked that he be kept and was told that he would be. Let me know if you hear of any glitches.
Glad to hear that you and Richard are starting to work together. Best, H

-----Original Message-----

From: David Petracus
To: Hillary Clinton
Sent: Jan 14, 2009 3:14 AM
Subject: RE: Follow up

P.S. Any feedback on possibility of keeping AMB Ford Fraker on the job in Riyadh until his replacement is confirmed? As you'll recall, this was a personal request from King Abdullah. Best - Dave

-----Original Message-----

From: hr15@att.blackberry.net (<mailto:hr15@att.blackberry.net>)
Sent: Saturday, January 10, 2009 3:57 PM
To: Petraeus, David H. GEN USA
Subject: Follow up

Dear Dave, Thanks for giving me so much of your time the last two nights. I appreciated our conversations and enjoyed the chance to see you and Richard becoming acquainted. I'm looking forward to working w you both. If there is ever anything you need or want me to know, pls use this personal email address. All the best, Hillary

From: H <HDR22@clintonemail.com>
Sent: Monday, January 31 2011 3:32 PM
To: Sullivan, Jacob J
Subject: Fw: H: Significant new intel from Drumheller and Lang on Egypt. Sid
Attachments: hrc memo intel egypt 013111.docx

Please print

----- Original Message -----

From: [redacted] b6 per FBI, DOS
To: H b7C

Sent: Mon Jan 31 11:25:34 2011

Subject: H: Significant new intel from Drumheller and Lang on Egypt. Sid

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

January 31, 2011

For: Hillary
From: Sid
Re: Intel on Egypt

I have had conversations today with Tyler Drumheller and Pat Lang on the Egyptian crisis. Drumheller has been in close contact with high level European intelligence officials with direct sources on the ground in Egypt. Lang is an old friend of Omar Suleiman. Below are notes on their information, followed by options based on our conversations:

1. The situations in Alexandria and Suez are exponentially worse than in Cairo - no police, no government, no magistrates, more violence, more deaths. The military wants to maintain itself and that means Mubarak will have to go. He wants to hold on for a couple of weeks so he doesn't have to flee.
2. Last fall Suleiman fell out of favor Mubarak for an unknown reason, probably because of Gamal's ambition. Suleiman has been much abused and tormented by Mubarak. He has been promised the VP job for 15 years, but never got it because Mubarak was afraid he would succeed him instead of Gamal. It was supposedly planned that Suleiman was to be in place while Gamal was trained, but it never happened. Suleiman is not popular with rest of military. He's from intelligence, not the army. He's not disliked, but the military also knows he's unacceptable to the people now.

The military knows it must reach an accommodation with the Muslim Brotherhood and is reaching out to the MB. Most of radical MB leaders are imprisoned; the military is talking to moderates. There's no Khomeini or Nasrallah out there. The problem is not the MB. The problem is the general level of religiosity among the lower classes that lack jobs.

4. The military wants a general as president and a civilian, someone like ElBaradei, as PM, but probably not EB, who has no political base, though his standing is growing.
5. The army has control of the situation, at least for now. This is not a bunch of young people playing with social media as depicted in the US press. The situation, however, has potential to go either way. But suppressing the crowds could mean a bloodbath, unacceptable to the military. The army hates the police. In 1985, the army fought the police in the streets. The police are disappearing or in some places completely gone. The police are burning their uniforms.
6. The military knows Mubarak must go. But when? If he holds on too long the situation will spin out of control. Another week may be too long. The general staff has to look Mubarak in the eye and tell him to go. Have they done it? Can they? They know he can't stay, but will they force him to leave?
7. The best case scenario would be a transition to elections with Suleiman as an interim head of state. But even that may be dicey at this point. Every day Mubarak stays the potential for disaster looms greater.
8. After some poor initial positioning, the US government has it right with your statements on Sunday. The idea of propping up Mubarak is gone. Obama calling Mubarak would do no good. He cannot be the messenger. The military should be praised for restraint in beginning to facilitate the transition. But the US may have to send an emissary to meet face-to-face with Mubarak to tell him he has to go. That person might be Admiral Mullen, but that puts the matter on a military to military basis. The Egyptians do not respect Colin Powell. One possibility who could do the job would be James Baker. A week is too long to wait

m: H <hrod17@clintonemail.com>
nt: Sunday, June 24, 2012 3:40 PM
To: 'sullivanjj@state.gov'
Subject: Re: H: Here it is: latest, latest intel on MB/SCAF inside deal. Sid

Former US intell w continuing contacts.

From: Sullivan, Jacob J [mailto:SullivanJJ@state.gov]
Sent: Sunday, June 24, 2012 03:36 PM
To: H
Subject: Re: H: Here it is: latest, latest intel on MB/SCAF inside deal. Sid

Will do. Wonder who his source is.

From: H [mailto:HDR22@clintonemail.com]
Sent: Sunday, June 24, 2012 03:16 PM
To: Sullivan, Jacob J
Subject: Fw: H: Here it is: latest, latest intel on MB/SCAF inside deal. Sid

Fyi Worth forwarding.

m: sbwhoeop [redacted] **b6 per DOS**
nt: Sunday, June 24, 2012 02:36 PM
To: H
Subject: H: Here it is: latest, latest intel on MB/SCAF inside deal. Sid

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

June 24 2012

For: Hillary
From: Sid
Re: The deal between MB & SCAF

SOURCE: Sources with access to the highest levels of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, and Western Intelligence and security services.

1. On the evening of June 23, 2012, senior officials attached to the Guidance committee of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) were called to an emergency, secret meeting with officers of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF). During this session the MB was informed that on the following day Egypt's Electoral Commission would announce the victory of Mohammed Morsi, the MB/Freedom and Justice Party (MB/FJP) candidate for President of Egypt. SCAF officers stated that their commander, Field Marshall Mohammed Hussein Tantawi, was concerned that the MB followers, as well as many of the secular/liberal groups were becoming increasingly volatile during the extended vote

counting period. The MB representatives, after a call to Supreme Guide Mohammed Badie, assured the SCAF that there would be no violence before the election results were announced. The SCAF officers reiterated their previous position that Tantawi and the SCAF do not want to rule the country, but they will not tolerate any move that limits either their budget, or their position of respect in society. The MB officials, who were extremely happy with the news they had just received, assured their SCAF interlocutors that Badie, Morsi, and the rest of the MB leadership were committed to this position.

2 According to a very sensitive source, the MB officials added that Morsi would chose government officials from a wide spectrum of parties and movements, ranging from the Salafist al Nour party to secular/liberal groups like the April 6 Movement. The SCAF officers had no problem with this, but added that the current military decrees would remain in place, at least until the constitution is drafted and a new parliament is elected. In the opinion of this individual, the MB representatives were under instructions from Badie to avoid getting into an argument on this point, at this particular time. Having won the presidency, Badie and his advisors believe that public opinion and political momentum will allow the MB to dominate the entire government. In this regard he also believes it is important that the MB not overreach, as Morsi, and the FJP speaker of Parliament, Saad Al-Katany had done in the weeks leading up to the second round of voting.

3 (Source Comment In the opinion of this individual, Badie believes that the aggressive tactics of the MB/FJP supporters, in the period immediately before the second round of voting, led to Tantawi moving to dissolve parliament, and redefine the duties of the president. The Supreme Guide wants Morsi to realize that if they maintain their studied pace, they will get everything they want. The MB polling noted that despite the fact that Morsi's opponent Ahmed Shafik is a former commanding general of the Air Force, approximately seventy (70) per cent of the regular army troops supported the MB candidate. At the same time, as many as forty (40) per cent of the members of the April 6 movement also voted for Morsi. The MB leadership also intends to include Coptic Christians and some women in the new government, in an effort to the new Egypt as an inclusive, moderate Islamic State. Their challenge is to find individuals who they feel they can trust, and who are willing to serve under Morsi. According to this individual, the Coptic community in particular is frustrated over what it sees as voter fraud and intimidation of its members by the FJP in Christian areas.)

4 At the end of this meeting, according to this source, the MB and SCAF representatives agreed to stay in contact and to do what is necessary to prevent any violence, while recognizing the important role the military will continue to play in Egyptian society. Both sides recognize that there will be incidents resulting from the political passions at play in the country and agree that they must prevent these incidents from getting out of hand. The SCAF officers also agreed that they would not overreact to statements from MB supporters regarding a reduced role for the military in government. The SCAF officers added that Tantawi was not unhappy with the result of the election, as he and Shafik have a poor personal relationship and a history of competition for power within the military under the regime of the former President Hosni Mubarak.

5. (Source Comment According to this individual, both sides agreed that their first order of business together in the new Egyptian political situation will be developing a coherent policy toward Israel. The SCAF officers pointed out that Israel is extremely concerned about the changes in Egypt. The MB officials added that they would like to maintain and enhance the policy the SCAF and MB developed during the 2011 uprising; maintaining the Peace Treaty with Israel, while limiting joint activity and cooperation on sensitive security matters. Both sides also agreed that, after the election, it will be important to create a positive working environment for foreign firms, particularly those from the United States and Western Europe. The MB officials stated that Badie and Morsi are firmly committed to a dual Islamic/Western banking system and good relations with Western firms. He regularly states that the West has dealt with Saudi Arabia for many years and the system he anticipates for Egypt will be far less restrictive than the one put in place by the Saudi rulers. Badie also believes the fact that Morsi was educated in the United States and has many good contacts in that country.)

6. The representatives of the MB and the SCAF will meet again during the week of June 25, and will continue regular contact as they prepare for the drafting of the new Constitution and parliamentary elections. Both sides agreed that they must also keep a careful eye on the situation in Syria, which could spread to Lebanon and other countries potentially creating a situation affecting Egypt's security.

~~SECRET//REL EYES~~

b6
b7C

From: "Abedin, Huma" <AbedinH@state.gov>
Sent: 7/4/2009 11:42:28 AM +00:00
To: H <hrod17@clintonemail.com>
Subject: Fw: Follow Up: Summary of 1055 EDT DPRK Conference Call

Fyi Classified by DAS, Dos on 2/29/2016 ~ Class. SECRET ~
Reason: 14(b) 14(c) 14(d) ~ Declassify: 07/03/2034

b6 per DOS

From: Beale, Courtney A Kramer
To: Sullivan, Jacob J; [redacted] Abedin, Huma; Mills, Cheryl D
Cc: S_SpecialAssistants; Macmanus, Joseph E
Sent: Sat Jul 04 07:35:08 2009
Subject: Fw: Follow Up: Summary of 1055 EDT DPRK Conference Call

FYI on Japanese statement on North Korean missile launches.

From: Pascual, Michael T
To: Smith-Wilson, Shelby V; SES_DutyDeputies; Barks-Ruggles, Erica J; Park, Pamela P; S_SpecialAssistants; Macmanus, Joseph E
Cc: SES-O_SWO-Only; Rosenberger, Laura M
Sent: Sat Jul 04 02:03:32 2009
Subject: RE: Follow Up: Summary of 1055 EDT DPRK Conference Call

Further to Shelby's email, Embassy Tokyo forward the following (unofficial translation of a statement issued by Japanese MOFA):

MOFA released a press announcement at 13:00 (MOFA: G-0738)

July 4, 2009

Regarding Japan's protest against the launch of a ballistic missile by North Korea.

Through the diplomatic route in Beijing, around 12:00 noon Japan sent North Korea the following message regarding today's North Korean ballistic missile launch:

~~SECRET//REL EYES~~

HRC-12523


~~SECRET//REFIDEL~~

1. The launch of a ballistic missile by North Korea is a significant act of provocation in terms of the security of neighboring countries, including our country, and a violation of UNSCR 1895, 1718 and 1874. Concerning today's launch of a ballistic missile, Japan strictly protests, and expresses sincere regret.
2. Japan urges North Korea to implement all related UNSC Resolutions, including suspension of all activities related to the ballistic missile plan immediately and completely. In addition, on this occasion, (we) strongly urge (North Korea) again to take concrete action toward the comprehensive resolution of related issues, such as the abduction issue, the nuclear issue and the missile issue.

From: Smith-Wilson, Shelby V
Sent: Saturday, July 04, 2009 12:13 AM
To: SES_DutyDeputies; Barks-Ruggles, Erica J; Park, Pamela P; S_SpecialAssistants; Macmanus, Joseph E
Cc: SES-O_SWO-Only; Rosenberger, Laura M
Subject: Follow Up: Summary of 1055 EDT DPRK Conference Call

To clarify a few points below:

b5 per DOS




From: Smith-Wilson, Shelby V
Sent: Friday, July 03, 2009 11:42 PM
To: SES_DutyDeputies; Barks-Ruggles, Erica J; Park, Pamela P; S_SpecialAssistants; Macmanus, Joseph E
Cc: SES-O_SWO-Only; Rosenberger, Laura M
Subject: Summary of 1055 EDT DPRK Conference Call

~~SECRET//REFIDEL~~

~~SECRET//REF FVEY~~

b1 per DOS
b5 per DOS

Dan,



~~SECRET//REF FVEY~~

HRC-12525

~~SECRET//REFIDEL~~

Shelby Smith-Wilson

Senior Watch Officer

U.S. Department of State (S/ES-O)

202-647-1512

b7E per DOS

**Message
Headers:**

From: "Abedin, Huma" <AbedinH@state.gov>
To: H <hrod17@clintonemail.com>

Date: Sat, 4 Jul 2009 07:42:28 -0400
Subject: Fw: Follow Up: Summary of 1:055 EDT DPRK Conference Call
Thread-Topic: Follow Up: Summary of 1:055 EDT DPRK Conference Call
Thread-Index:

~~SECRET//REFIDEL~~

From: H <hrod17@clintonemail.com>
Sent: Friday, June 17, 2011 5:21 AM
To: 'sullivanjj@state.gov'
Subject: Re: [redacted]

If they can't, turn into noripaper w no identifying heading and send nonsecure

From: Sullivan, Jacob J [mailto:SullivanJJ@state.gov]
Sent: Friday, June 17, 2011 08:17 AM
To: H
Subject: Re: [redacted]

b5 per DOS

They say they've had issues sending secure fax. They're working on it.

From: Sullivan, Jacob J
Sent: Friday, June 17, 2011 08:00 AM
To: 'HDR22@clintonemail.com' <HDR22@clintonemail.com>
Subject: Re: [redacted]

!!!! Checking

From: H [mailto:HDR22@clintonemail.com]
Sent: Friday, June 17, 2011 07:52 AM
To: Sullivan, Jacob J
Subject: Re: [redacted]

b5 per DOS

I didn't get the TPs yet.

From: Sullivan, Jacob J [mailto:SullivanJJ@state.gov]
Sent: Thursday, June 16, 2011 05:51 PM
To: H
Subject: Fw: [redacted]

You'll get tps this eve. They're coming together.

From: Spence, Matthew J. [mailto:[redacted]]
Sent: Thursday, June 16, 2011 04:15 PM
To: Sullivan, Jacob J
Subject: [redacted]

b5 per DOS
b6 per FBI, DOS
b7C

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

b6
b7C

From: Hanley, Monica R <HanleyMR@state.gov>
Sent: Monday, April 9, 2012 6:43 AM
To: H
Cc: Huma Abedin
Subject: Re: Call to President Banda

The call is confirmed for 730am. Marina will have the call sheet, the bio and action memo for your reference.

----- Original Message -----

From: Hanley, Monica R
Sent: Sunday, April 08, 2012 10:41 PM
To: 'HDR22@clintonemail.com' <HDR22@clintonemail.com>
Cc: 'huma@clintonemail.com' <huma@clintonemail.com>
Subject: Re: Call to President Banda

Classified by DAS, A/GIS, DoS on
1/29/2016 ~ Class: CONFIDENTIAL ~
Reason: 1.4(d) ~ Declassify on: 4/7/2027

Thanks - will get back with you as soon as we hear back from them.

----- Original Message -----

From: H [mailto:HDR22@clintonemail.com]
Sent: Sunday, April 08, 2012 10:37 PM
To: Hanley, Monica R
Cc: Huma Abedin <Huma@clintonemail.com>
Subject: Re: Call to President Banda

7:30 works for me.

----- Original Message -----

From: Hanley, Monica R [mailto:HanleyMR@state.gov]
Sent: Sunday, April 08, 2012 10:18 PM
To: H
Cc: Huma Abedin
Subject: Call to President Banda

I'm sorry for the late email but we just received a call sheet for Malawi President Banda.

Are you open to taking this at 7:30am tomorrow? If so, we can reach out overnight. Otherwise, we will find other widows that work tomorrow for you.

This did not make it with the pouch but we can ask Marina to print this and her bio for you if a 7:30am call works for both you and President Banda.

The Secretary's Call Sheet for Malawi President Joyce Banda

(C) Purpose of Call: To offer condolences on the passing of President Mutharika and congratulate President Banda on her recent swearing in.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

From: Mills, Cheryl D
Sent: Tuesday, December 11, 2012 7:15 PM
To: Johnson, Brock A
Subject: Re: Significant FOIA Report

Thanks

From: Johnson, Brock A
Sent: Tuesday, December 11, 2012 05:39 PM
To: Mills, Cheryl D
Subject: FW: Significant FOIA Report

FYI on the attached FOIA request from:

- Anne Weismann of Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington (CREW) requesting "records sufficient to show the number of email accounts of or associated with Secretary Hillary Rodham Clinton, and the extent to which those email accounts are identifiable as those of or associated with Secretary Clinton."

From: IPS-STAFF-Assistants
Sent: Tuesday, December 11, 2012 4:11 PM
To: Larkins, Neal B
Cc: Johnson, Brock A; Finney, Clarence N; Walter, Sheryl L; Reid, Rosemary E; A Staff Collective; Wasser, Jonathon D; Stein, Eric F; Davis, Jonathan E; Smilansky, Gene
Subject: Significant FOIA Report
Importance: High

All:

Attached is the Significant FOIA Report for this week. Please contact me if you have any questions.

Thank you,

Olivia Woods
Staff Assistant to the Director
U.S. Department of State
Office of Information Programs and Services
A/GIS/IPS
(202) 663-1012
SA-2, Room 5081-A

Our Mission is to meet the needs of our customers and the United States Government

DOS READING ROOM
F-2016-07895, C06131656

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

From: Huma Abedin <huma@clintonemail.com> on behalf of Huma Abedin
Sent: Friday, November 26, 2010 6:59 AM
To: H
Subject: MbZ call - 7:15am

Classified by Director A/GIS/IPS
Acting DoS on 11/3/2016 ~
Class: CONFIDENTIAL ~
Reason: 1.4(iB), 1.4(D) ~
Declassify on: 11/26/2030

In addition to note from Jeff I emailed and faxed you. Senator Jeff spoke with Abu yesterday and Yousef has been in regular touch with many of us.

The Secretary's Call Direct for UAE Crown Prince Mohammed bin Nayef

b5 per DOS

Purpose of Call: [redacted]

[redacted]

Background: [redacted]

[redacted]

b1 per DOS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Front: Cheryl Mills [redacted] b6 per FBI, DOS
Sent: Monday, March 09, 2015 2:39 PM b7C
To: [redacted]
Cc: [redacted] David Kendall
Subject: Re Email/Data Systems

Dear [redacted]

b6
b7C

Thank you for reviewing the existing tapes you collected with other equipment from the Clinton's residence when Platte River took over the systems in June 2013. I appreciate your review of those tapes, which you have stored in the data center since that time.

As we have discussed in the last week and consistent with the preservation email David Kendall shared with you, please do continue to preserve all relevant materials.

Thank you so much

best

cdm

On Mon, Mar 9, 2015 at 2:10 PM [redacted] wrote:
Cheryl,

b6
b7C

Upon review of your email/data systems, we have not found any backups or any data that existed before we took over in June of 2013. However, we are backing up the data as it exists today, and continue to keep and maintain that retention policy. To our knowledge there are no backups or data on the systems that would hold any data previous to our involvement; that is not to say there could have been older backups that have since been overwritten or deleted, and could still be forensically found on the disks by means of advanced software. But this is not to our knowledge, and thus out of our control. Please let us know if you have any further questions or concerns.

Thank you,

b6
b7C

[redacted]
SIP 115-15-01
PLATTE NETWORKS

Microsoft

TECHNOLOGY

[redacted]
b1
b3

From: "Sullivan, Jacob J" <SullivanJJ@state.gov>
Sent: 8/25/2010 3:46:05 PM +00:00
To: H <hrd17@clintonemail.com>
Subject: Fw: NY Times article on Salehi

Fyi

Classified by DAS, A/GIS, DoS on
2/29/2016 ~ Class. SECRET ~
Reason. 1.4(c) ~ Declassify on:
8/24/2035

---- Original Message ----

From: Holbrooke, Richard
To: Sullivan, Jacob J
Sent: Wed Aug 25 11:32:24 2010
Subject: Fw: NY Times article on Salehi

Jake make She is aware

[redacted]
b1 per FBI, DOS
b3

---- Original Message ----

From: Feldman, Daniel F
To: Holbrooke, Richard
Sent: Wed Aug 25 11:27:03 2010
Subject: FW: NY Times article on Salehi

----Original Message----

From: Lussenhop, Matthew R
Sent: Wednesday, August 25, 2010 11:21 AM
To: Crowley, Philip J; Toner, Mark C; Hart, Erin M; Kabul Press, Singh, Vikram J; Bommer, Ashley F; Simon, Jessica L; Guice, Stephen A; Benini, Carla A
Cc: Keith, James R; Ensor, David B
Subject: NY Times article on Salehi

All,

NY Times Dexter Filkins has been in touch today seeking Embassy comment on a story he says the Times will run tomorrow alleging that Muhammad Zia Salehi has been on the Agency payroll. Embassy's line has been and will be the standard approach – that we refrain from comment on stories discussing intelligence matters.

Regards,

Matt

Matt Lussenhop

Public Affairs Counselor

[redacted]
b1
b3

[REDACTED] b1
b3

b6 per DOS

US Embassy Kabul

office: (93-0)700-108-239 , US: (301) 490-1042 [REDACTED]

lussenhopmr@state.gov

Kabul usembassy.gov facebook icon
<http://www.facebook.com/pages/Kabul-Afghanistan/US-Embassy-Kabul/34734118909?sid=8b4da87492
2ad9ed77f569cf9805e662&ref=s> twitter icon <http://twitter.com/USEmbassyKabul>
flickr_16 <http://www.flickr.com/photos/kabulpublicdiplomacy/> cid:image002.jpg@01CB1D2A.76C401A0
<http://www.facebook.com/usembassymalaysia> cid:image001.jpg@01CB1D2A.76C401A0
<http://twitter.com/usembassykl> cid:image002.jpg@01CB1D2A.76C401A0
<http://www.facebook.com/usembassymalaysia> cid:image001.jpg@01CB1D2A.76C401A0
<http://twitter.com/usembassykl> cid:image002.jpg@01CB1D2A.76C401A0
<http://www.facebook.com/usembassymalaysia>

S8U

This email is UNCLASSIFIED.

Message Headers:

[REDACTED]

From: "Sullivan, Jacob J" <SullivanJJ@state.gov>
To: H <hrod17@clintonemail.com> [REDACTED]


b7E per DOS

Date: Wed, 25 Aug 2010 11:46:05 -0400
Subject: Fw: NY Times article on Saleh

[REDACTED]

b1
b3


HRC-12550



b1
b3

Thread-Topic: NY Times article on Sa-eh:

b7E per DOS



b1
b3

HRC-12551

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
FOI/PA
DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET
FOI/PA# 1353814-000

Total Deleted Page(s) = 14

Page 6 ~ Duplicate;
Page 7 ~ Duplicate;
Page 8 ~ Duplicate;
Page 9 ~ Duplicate;
Page 10 ~ Duplicate;
Page 11 ~ Duplicate;
Page 15 ~ Duplicate;
Page 16 ~ Duplicate;
Page 17 ~ Duplicate;
Page 18 ~ Duplicate;
Page 19 ~ Duplicate;
Page 20 ~ Duplicate;
Page 21 ~ Duplicate;
Page 22 ~ Duplicate;

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
X Deleted Page(s) X
X No Duplication Fee X
X For this Page X
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

IA2

~~SECRET//ADORN~~

FD-340 (Rev. 4-3-93)

File Number

b3
b7E

by Office Acquiring Evidence HD-CO4

Serial # of Originating Document

Date Received 7/10/2015

From Meeting of ICIG

(Name or Classification Enclosed)

b6
b7C

Region 3

(Address)

Washington, DC 20531

b6
b7C

By [redacted]

To Be Returned Yes No

Receipt Given Yes No

Grand Jury Material - Disseminate Only Pursuant to Rule 6 (c)

Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure

Yes No

Federal Taxpayer Information (FTI)

Yes No

Title:

Reference:

EC Serial

(Communication Enclosing Material)

Description: Original notes re interview of

- meeting w/ ICIG on 7/10/15

- SII referral

- Classified e-mails and supporting documents

~~SECRET//ADORN~~

ICIG 7/10/15

- * Copy of preservation letters to DOS.
- * Who at IG or DOS received ^{copy of SII Referral} ~~the preservation letter~~. Have they called back?
- * Will the FOIA requests still be processed and reviewed?
 - Can we put on hold?
 - When will next batch be released? disclosed via FOIA?
- * - Need to minimize Bigot list / need to know who in IG/IC should be on it?
- * Do you have copy of recommendation to kill?
- Item 3 on page 2 of U.S. Senate Letter - look for classified
 - Clinton's only one who said yes to HSCC's questions regarding who all Sec. of State past 5 DOS Secretary of State.
- Not just one e-mail.
- * Who actually reviewed e-mail and identified possible classified William Frank Rucker - expert in classification - reviewed about 256 emails, found e-mail regarding email date/include in referral to FBI.
- * Plaintiff was at ICIG last week for meeting. Next meeting?
 - Per Plaintiff's ^{williamfrankrucker} attorneys have thumb drives.
 - Who asked attorneys for thumb drives. on State.gov, FBI website. Frank has them.
- * Frank was at DOS reviewing 30K docs, found 296 on inwards, + 40 ICIG docs.
- * Kennedy at State is in charge of FDIA response - different to work
 - ICIG just received yesterday a copy of 30K from State. ^{7/9/15} (one week)
 - Kennedy said he would not go back to judge with request to change order of releasing 1,000 docs per month.
- * ~~David Goldstein~~ Steve A. Linick needs to be interviewed.
- * ~~Steve~~ also received internal at State.

over 1,000
coming July 30th

E.O. provides OOS -

- SB in initial stages, but changes to S/W/P once released or disseminated.
 - Publish
 - Does not apply to 3rd party until only, but conversations between diplomats, only when released.
- From random sampling - all e-mails seem to only be inbound.
 -
- State has NOT yet searched their mainframe for her e-mails.
- Two e-mails in 296 contained classified
 - one was redacted, one ~~redacted~~ was NOT.
 - Frank has asked for unredacted versions.
- The 4 new e-mails provided are part of 40 Frank looked at.

Snatch Korker: will be informed by ICIIS today. -

(1)

07/10/15

- Of the five secretaries of State and their immediate staffs
Ebel is the only one that said yes.
- Made recommendations to USDS
 - John Hackett is head of USDS information management division he
has some control over staff.
 - He says several out. Picked out 40 docs that they had
by William Franklin Buckley
- Up to 5 classified documents - under scrutiny.
- AFRI COM doc: NGA says still class ~~X//FVEY~~
- Hackett thinks there are hundreds of emails.
- USDS has a unique authority to upgrade (cause in FOIA) them if you
ask.
- USDS sent DSS over to get think does he send no. (3 copies all in bulk
in law firm). They for defense, A law firm is cleared
- Pat Kennedy is in charge of FOIA and he is coming up in a lot of
the emails on being a witness of her. Rumors are that she
will be the new Sec of State. USDS
- Generate a report to State Dept (16)
- FOIA is past admin stage. Court has them on 1000 docs every 30 days.
- my info presumption it was all unclassified when they set
the schedule.
- DSS Office of Information Policy deals with it.
- DNI gets form to file a declaration
- This item was head of Global Information Services. (S26) at USDS called it
S26 also is responsible for classification and declassification (not to operate FOIA)
S26 is about security information B5 13 declassification process.
- USDS has a special executive order to upgrade if it's going to be released.
- 30,000 docs are on a DVD.
- Will get 296. docs we on the Internet, 1000 published on the Internet
- 40 emails cleared by DNI. 30000 request is pending about a week
- Hackett originally thought he said one thousand documents.
- Platte River is Chappaqua, NY group by USDS agents
- Frank will be person who won't tell us
- Another issue w/ the Foreign
- All got us the preservation letter.

(2)

07/16/15

- Gay Hark is the Staffer on Foreign Affairs (Carter's Arch) & H will be told at all meetings (Carroll and Johnson)
- ~54,000 pages of material. 4,144 are from 30,000 pages
- Visak → USDS attorney.
- John Hackett wrote in an email to his sergeant that there are hundreds of classified docs
- July 30 the next Docket of 1000 are supposed to go out.
- They will give a few OIC contacts who are tracking the classification determinations.
- All emails are in box (no sent).
- Bishop is addressed as H or S.
- H hasn't signed a non-disclosure statement of USDS servers for her email address
- Recently Blumenthal provided Sue Bengazi emails at request to 30000 \$15 were missing on some of the USDS non-disclosure. They took new payment letter. H will send preservation letter to USDS.
- USDS.gov has FOIA ready room.
- DDCI Information management office (info) and
- 2 art of 2016 → APR 18 on
 - FBI suggested a B1 on one since was related to day we
 - Frank's 40 : one where the new 4 from today came from
- Try to give us [redacted] double down emails. b6 per DOS
- Today or Monday: Carter will brief at 10 & referred to FBI
- USDS E.O. for exports - emails from 10/3/16 forward.
- 40 docs → 30,000 emails
- preservation letter → new USDS non-disclosure preservation letter.
- Cart + info

United States Senate
WASHINGTON, DC 20510

March 12, 2015

U.S. Department of State
Office of Inspector General
Room 8100, SA-3
2201 C Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20520-0308

Dear Inspector General Linick:

We write to you today concerning the recent revelations that former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and other top aides used non-State Department email addresses and servers to conduct official U.S. Government business. We are concerned that diplomatically sensitive, and possibly classified, information may have been transmitted and stored in an insecure manner.

Foreign intelligence organizations and malicious actors continuously probe our government's information systems for weaknesses and attempt targeted intrusions. As you know, the federal government has experienced a number of sophisticated intrusions in recent years, and the threat is only growing. The use of privately maintained information systems that are not protected by federal government experts and key technical capabilities raises serious concerns as those networks may be less secure. Moreover, if a non-government server was known to be a repository for the Secretary's emails, it would almost certainly become—if it is not already—a priority target for foreign intelligence services and others.

To ensure appropriate security protections for sensitive but unclassified information the State Department's Foreign Affairs Manual policy, in place since 2005, requires that "normal day-to-day operations be conducted on an authorized AIS [Automated Information System], which has the proper level of security control to provide nonrepudiation, authentication and encryption, to ensure confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the resident information." The policy also states that "employees are expected to use approved secure methods to transmit SBU [sensitive but unclassified] information when available and practical." Furthermore, it is our understanding that the State Department has specifically instructed its employees, ostensibly during Secretary Clinton's tenure, to avoid conducting official Department business from personal e-mail accounts.

In addition, there are serious questions about the use of such non-government accounts on federal recordkeeping and transparency, particularly if it results in non-compliance with the Federal Records Act and National Archives and Records Administration (NARA)

regulations. Potential noncompliance with these requirements, many of which are imposed by federal law, is a serious matter.

We ask that your office, in coordination with the Inspector General for the Intelligence Community, and any other appropriate Federal entities, conduct a thorough audit related to electronic communications by State Department employees, including former senior officials, that were principally carried out on non-government-owned, or non-government-protected, information networks. Further, we ask that you provide a written report to the relevant congressional committees detailing your findings and any recommendations. The report should include the following:


1. The names and positions of State Department officials who regularly used non-official email to conduct official government business.
2. A specific description of the non-government information networks or systems that were used to transmit such email, to include:
 - a. the network security measures in place on such networks and systems from 2009 to 2013;
 - b. the means, if any, by which the network's security incorporated classified cyber security threat information controlled by the U.S. government;
 - c. the type of wireless communication devices that connected to the systems;
 - d. the location and ownership of the servers and other components of such networks or systems;
 - e. the names of individuals and entities that had authorized access to such networks or systems, including specifically those with authorized administrative access; and
 - f. the funding source for the system, its maintenance, upkeep, and administration.
3. An assessment of whether any of the State Department or other U.S. or foreign government information transmitted or received on such networks or systems contained classified, sensitive but unclassified, diplomatically sensitive, or otherwise nonpublic material.
4. A determination of whether any non-government emails used to conduct official government business or other government information has been deleted from these information networks or systems or altered from their original content, and, if applicable, an estimate of the number of emails or material that was deleted or altered.
5. A determination of whether all emails and other information that was required to be archived pursuant to the Federal Records Act or other legal or regulatory requirements were provided to the State Department or other government agencies for archiving, and whether the timing and nature of these actions was consistent with State Department policy, as well as applicable federal law and regulations.

We ask that this be an unclassified report, and that a classified annex be provided if necessary. Thank you for your time, and we look forward to working with you on this important matter of national security.

Sincerely,



Chairman Bob Corker
Senate Foreign Relations Committee



Chairman Richard Burr
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence



Chairman Lamar Johnson
Senate Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs Committee

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

FOI/PA

DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET

FOI/PA# 1353814-000

Total Deleted Page(s) = 6

Page 4 ~ OTHER - See DOS Reading Room F-2014-20439 Doc. No. C057962;

Page 5 ~ OTHER - See DOS Reading Room F-2014-20439 Doc. No. C057962;

Page 7 ~ b1 - per DOS; b5 - per DOS; b6; b7C;

Page 8 ~ b1 - per DOS; b6; b7C;

Page 9 ~ b1 - per DOS; b6; b7C;

Page 10 ~ b1 - per DOS; b6; b7C;

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

X Deleted Page(s) X

X No Duplication Fee X

X For this Page X

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

[redacted]
[redacted]
b5 per DOS

RELEASE IN PART
B5,B6

From: Mills, Cheryl D <MillsCD@state.gov>
Sent: Saturday, November 27, 2010 4:17 PM
To: H
Subject: Fw: Follow Up

DOS READING ROOM.
F-2014-20439: C05771810

Fyl

----- Original Message -----

From: Crowley, Phillip J
To: Mills, Cheryl D; Sullivan, Jacob J; Mull, Stephen D; Burns, William J; Smith, Dana S
Sent: Sat Nov 27 16:00:20 2010
Subject: FW: Follow Up

FYI [redacted]

PJ

b5 per DOS

B6

----- Original Message -----

From: Shane, Scott [mailto:[redacted]]
Sent: Saturday, November 27, 2010 12:41 PM
To: Crowley, Phillip J
Cc: Baquet, Dean; Corbett, Rebecca
Subject: Re: Follow Up

b6 per DOS

PJ, do you have an ETA of any on record statement? Would greatly appreciate getting it asap.

Also, the editors asked me to share with you our decisions on government concerns about the first batch. We have redacted the Libya and China cables with vulnerable sources; we are not posting the Russian cable at all. (We are redacting other Russia and China cables.) We are not posting the Van Diepen US-Russia missile cable at all. And we are redacting the Thailand refugee route from the Seoul cable.

BG

However, we are naming MtZ, AbZ and King Hamad; we are running Mr. Ruggiero's name; and we are posting the Humint collection cable.

Even where we've disagreed, we greatly appreciate your team's time and care in pointing out hazards. In some cases your advice has prompted changes in the wording of stories, in addition to what we've cut out.

More decisions to come.

Best

Scott

Scott Shane
New York Times
Washington bureau

[redacted]
b6 per DOS

18395

HRC-12689

[REDACTED]
----- Original Message -----

From: Crowley, Philip J <CrowleyPJ@state.gov>
To: Shane, Scott
Sent: Fri Nov 26 18:31:22 2010
Subject: Re: Follow Up

We are actually sorting through who will provide comment. It will be tomorrow early afternoon before we square this away. I will keep you posted.

PJ

----- Original Message -----

From: Shane, Scott [REDACTED]
To: Crowley, Philip J [REDACTED]
Sent: Fri Nov 26 16:22:36 2010
Subject: RE: Follow Up

b6

Thanks, PJ, and thanks for your continuing input and good humor Please don't forget the on-record stuff when you have a minute [REDACTED] asked if we wanted something from DNI and I said she was free to send it but that State was the logical commenter on behalf of the government.

Scott Shane
New York Times
Washington bureau
[REDACTED]

b6 per DOS

From: Crowley, Philip J {CrowleyPJ@state.gov}
Sent: Friday, November 26, 2010 4:19 PM
To: Shane, Scott
Subject: Follow Up

On GTMO, I'm told there is an active negotiation with Ukraine that if revealed may jeopardize it. That is the one country that everyone asks not be mentioned.

PJ

This email is UNCLASSIFIED.

b6

b7C

RELEASE IN PART
B1.B5.1.4(D)

[redacted]
b5 per DOS

From: H <hrod17@clintonemail.com>
Sent: Sunday, September 13, 2009 7:48 AM
To: 'millsd@state.gov'
Cc: 'sullivanjj@state.gov'; 'abedinh@state.gov'
Subject: Re: FW: For S -- for discussion on Afghanistan tomorrow

DOS READING ROOM
F-2014-20439 C05759633

Yes. Thx.

----- Original Message -----

From: Mills, Cheryl D <MillsCD@state.gov>
To: H
Cc: Sullivan, Jacob J <SullivanJJ@state.gov>; Abedin, Huma <AbedinH@state.gov>
Sent: Sun Sep 13 07:47:17 2009
Subject: FW: For S -- for discussion on Afghanistan tomorrow

Classified by DAS A/GIS Dos on
1/29/2016 ~ Class: CONFIDENTAL ~
Reason: 1.4(D) ~ Declassify on:
09/12/2024

is this what you are speaking of?

-----Original Message-----

From: Slaughter, Annie-Marie
Sent: Saturday, September 12, 2009 9:23 PM
To: Mills, Cheryl D; Sullivan, Jacob J
Cc: Cholet, Derek H; Steinberg, James B; Abedin, Huma
Subject: For S -- for discussion on Afghanistan tomorrow

b1 per DOS
b5 per DOS

I had a long talk with [redacted]

(D)
(D)

X

01231

HRC-12693

UNCLASSIFIED

U.S. Department of State
Case No. P-2016-04841
Dsp. No. 003739658
Date: 05/13/2016

STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.

b6
b7CRELEASE IN
FULL

From: Abedin, Huma <AbedinH@state.gov>
Sent: Sunday, April 10, 2011 10:14 AM
To: H
Subject: Fw: Stevens Update (Important)

Importance: High

Joke may have sent but in case not..

----- Original Message -----

From: Davis, Timmy ?
Sent: Sunday, April 10, 2011 03:18 AM
To: Sullivan, Jacob J.; Abedin, Huma; Wells, Alice G.; S_Special Assistants
Subject: Stevens Update (Important)

(SBU) Per Special Envoy Stevens:

- The situation in Ajdabiyah has worsened to the point where Stevens is considering departure from Benghazi. The envoy's delegation is currently doing a phased checkout (paying the hotel bills, moving some commo to the boat, etc). He will monitor the situation to see if it deteriorates further, but no decision has been made on departure. He will wait 2-3 more hours, then revisit the decision on departure.
- He received reports of shelling last night in Ajdabiyah as well as snipers shooting people in the city. AFRICOM reported Qadhafi's forces took the eastern and western gates of Ajdabiyah, with 5 vehicles at the eastern gate and 50 at the western gate. More Qadhafi forces are heading to Ajdabiyah from Brega.
- The Brits report Qadhafi forces are moving from Sirte to Brega, which they interpret as preparation for another assault on Ajdabiyah today.
- He plans to discuss the situation further with the Brits, Turks, and the TNC to see if this is an irreversible situation. Depature would send a significant political signal, and would be interpreted as the U.S. losing confidence in the TNC. Initial message to the TNC would frame the departure as due to security grounds and as a temporary measure only.
- Polaschik said she would discuss these developments with Amb. Cretz.
- If the group departs, the contract for the boat stipulates they return to Greece. One scenario could be the group stages elsewhere for a few days.

Ops will continue to monitor the situation.

UNCLASSIFIED
U.S. Department of State
Case No. P-2016-04841
Dsp. No. 003739658
Date: 05/13/2016

STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.

STATE-201604841

HRC-12698